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Labor and employment laws are systematically underenforcedin
low-wage, franchised workplaces. Union contracts, and the benefits
and protections they provide, are nonexistent. The Fightfor Fifteen
movement has brought attention to the low wages, systemic violations
of workers' rights, and lack of collective representation in fast-food
franchises. Given that franchisees can be judgment-proofand cannot
set industry standards, the deterrence, remedial, and collective
bargaining goals of labor and employment laws can depend on
holding the franchisor (the brand) responsible under the joint
employer doctrine. In a series of cases, however, a dominant approach
has emerged that essentiallyforeclosed the possibility thatfranchisors
and their subordinate companies (franchisees) are joint employers.
Recent political developments mirror this foreclosure and pose a

historic narrowingof the scope ofjoint employer liability. This Article
challenges courts, administrative agencies, and legislators to take
more seriously franchisors'power over their franchisees and the
working conditions of low-wage fast-food workers. To advance this
argument, we rely on insights from an originalempirical data set of
(1) forty-four contracts between leading fast-food franchisors and
franchisees in 2016 and (2) comprehensive documentationprovided in
joint employer legal proceedings against two major fast-food
franchisors in the United States: McDonald's and Domino's Pizza.
Our proposed "power as employment control" construct considers,

within the confines of existing doctrines, the cumulative effects of lead
franchisorfirms' reserved (unexercised) and exercised influence over
the working conditions in their subordinate businesses. By giving

power more consideration in analyses of joint employer liability,
courts, administrative agencies, and policy-makers can bring more
justice and consistency to this hotly contested area.
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B.

INTRODUCTION

Four million people in the United States work in fast-food franchise stores.'
Fast-food employees are disproportionately people of color and women, and they
are among the lowest-paid workers in the United States. 2 They have joined the
Griffith is McKelvey-Grant Professor at Cornell's ILR School and an Associate Member of
**
the Cornell Law Faculty. The authors would like to thank the Russell Sage Foundation for providing
funding for the research. We appreciate the excellent work of the student researchers who supported the
project over several years, including Caro Achar, Hugh Baran, Deandra Fike, Mimi Goldberg, Michael
Iadevaia, Christopher Ioannou, Michelle Lee, Emma LoMastro, Zane Mokhiber, Shanzay Pervaiz,
Nathan Pflaum, Aida Shipley, and Olivia St. Amand. The authors would like to thank Rachel ArnowRichman, Michael Harper, Wilma Liebman, Mark Pedulla, and Brishen Rogers for their thoughtful
comments, Rose Batt, Lance Compa, Tashlin Lakhani, Can Ouyang, and Tony Royle for their
collaboration on the Russell Sage project, and the CaliforniaLaw Review editors for excellent research
assistance. This project also benefitted from feedback at the 2019 Colloquium on Scholarship in
Employment and Labor Law.
1. FRANDATA, FRANCHISE BUSINESS ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2020, at 19 (2019),
https://fmnchiseeconomy.com/assets/32304.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZUD9-TH93]. Nearly half of all
employees who work for a franchise in the United States work in the fast-food sector. Id.
2.
21.4 percent of fast-food employees are African American, and 26.2 percent are Latinx
far higher than the 13.4 percent of the general U.S. population that is African American and the 18.5
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Fight for Fifteen, a movement of fast-food and low-wage workers led by unions
and affiliated community organizations. In addition to its demands for a $15
minimum wage and a union, the Fight for Fifteen challenges the problems of low
wages, systemic violations of workplace laws, and lack of collective
representation in franchised fast-food stores. 3
Often catalyzed by the Fight for Fifteen, employees and enforcement
agencies have brought a flurry of claims alleging violations of wage and hour
and labor laws in franchise stores. 4 They have made claims not only against
franchisees but also, more broadly, against the franchisors that effectively set the
terms of employment in their franchised stores. 5 For example, the Fight for
Fifteen movement backed a series of complaints to the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB or Board) that named both McDonald's and its franchisees as joint

employers responsible for retaliation against workers' collective fight to improve
wages. 6 During the Obama administration, this initiative led the Board to
announce that it would consider whether both franchisors and franchisees are
joint employers liable for violations of labor law.7 Fight for Fifteen has also
catalyzed significant state-level government enforcement actions. In one such
case, Fight for Fifteen complaints led the New York Attorney General (NYAG)
to file suit, claiming that Domino's Pizza is a joint employer co-liable for wage
percent that is Latinx. IRENE TUNG, YANNET LATHROP & PAUL SONN, NAT'L EMP. L. PROJECT, THE
GROWING MOVEMENT FOR $15 1, 11 (2015), https://www.nelp.org/wp-content/uploads/Growing-

Movement-for-15-Dollars.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2ZE-3DKV]; Quick Facts: United States, U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU
(2019),
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045219
[https://perma.cc/NN46-ELHT]. Although women make up only 50.8 percent of the U.S. population,
71.1 percent of fast-food employees are women. TUNG ET AL., supra, at 11. The National Employment
Law Project reports from Current Population Survey data that the median wage of fast-food workers is
$8.25 per hour. Id.
3.

STEVEN GREENHOUSE, BEATEN DOWN, WORKED UP: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

OF AMERICAN LABOR 232-52 (2019); William Finnegan, Dignity:Fast-FoodWorkers and a New Form
of
Labor
Activism,
NEW
YORKER
(Sept.
8,
2014),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/15/dignity-4
[https://penna.cc/52A2-GZC3]. Labor
law scholars have written extensively about the strategies and goals of the Fight for Fifteen movement.
Kate Andrias, for example, focused on the movement's novel use of the New York State wage board as
a form of tripartite, social bargaining. See Kate Andrias, The New LaborLaw, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 63-68
(2016). Michael Oswalt highlighted its embrace of impactful one-day strikes, short-term walkouts, and
boycotts. See generallyMichael M. Oswalt, ImprovisationalUnionism, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 597 (2016).
4. The Fight for Fifteen both catalyzed litigation seeking to hold fast-food franchisors
responsible for labor and employment law violations and provoked "abacklash among powerful interest
groups who aim to narrow the scope of joint employer law." Kati L. Griffith & Leslie C. Gates, Milking
OutdatedLaws: Alt-Labor as a Litigation Catalyst, 95 CHI-KENT L. REV. 245, 249 (2020).
5.

Andrew Elmore, FranchiseRegulation for the FissuredEconomy, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV.

907, 939-40 (2018).
6.

Emily Bazelon, Why Are Workers Struggling?Because Labor Law Is Broken, N.Y. TIMES

MAG. (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/02/19/magazine/labor-lawunions.html [https://perma.cc/B9XJ-FG75]. Fight for Fifteen has more recently supported the claims of
McDonald's employees who have filed a class-action Title VII sexual harassment claim against
McDonald's as a joint employer of franchise store employees. Dee-Ann Durbin, McDonald's Workers
Say Anti-Harassment Efforts Fall Short, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Nov.
12,
2019),
https://apnews.com/article/59500624d8d649508aac902aba037513 [https://perma.cc/VPL7-MA6V].
7.
Elmore, supra note 5, at 939 n.147.
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and hour law violations by its franchisees. 8 The success of this movement turns
on holding franchisors legally accountable for wages, working conditions, and
collective bargaining responsibilities. 9 Incentivizing franchisors to improve
working conditions in these stores, however, is contingent upon a plausible
theory of joint employer liability.

Joint employer doctrine extends liability to a lead firm at the top of a
production chain for labor and employment law violations that take place in a
subordinate company's workplace.' 0 Joint employer liability extends to the lead
firm (here, a franchisor) when it influences working conditions in the subordinate
business's operation (here, a franchisee)."
Even where franchisee liability is clear, fulfilling the purposes of labor and
employment laws often depends on a finding that the lead entity, or franchisor,
is jointly responsible along with the franchisee for wages and working
conditions. While recognizing that the joint employer question affects all
workplace laws, we focus on the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA)
and Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) because they are both Depression-

era laws that constitute a major source ofjoint employer litigation involving fastfood franchisors.1 2 The NLRA and FLSA predate modern franchising but allow
courts and administrative agencies to interpret their scope and adapt their
enforcement to changes in workplaces and economic relationships.
In order to address inequality in bargaining power between individual
employees and employers, the NLRA affords employees the right to join unions
and to act collectively to improve their wages and working conditions.

13 Meeting

this statutory goal, however, relies on joint employer liability. Because

8. See Andrew Elmore, Collaborative Enforcement, 10 NE. U. L. REV. 72, 104-05 (2018).
Elmore was a Section Chief in the New York Office of the Attorney General's Labor Bureau until June
2015. The views expressed in this Article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the Bureau or the Office.
9. Andrew Elmore & Kati Griffith, Opinion, A Bad Rule Lets Fast-FoodChains Off the Hook
for Workers' Rights, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/opiion/story/2020-0309/labor-law-fast-food-franchises [https://penna.cc/39PN-LW9P].
10. See infra PartI.
11. Id Franchising is only one of many types of contracting arrangements that implicate the
joint employer doctrine. Some typical subcontracting arrangements are not plausible joint employer
relationships. We focus on franchising because of the extensive forms of control often found in franchise
agreements and in public agencies' investigation findings, which are not yet accounted for in joint
employer case law.
12. We also reference employment discrimination litigation, in which courts consider whether
franchisors are joint employers in ways that mirror the joint employer standard under the NLRA and
FLSA. See infra Parts L.A and I.IV.
13. 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West 2021) (declaring that labor law is necessary to address "[t]he
inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or
actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership
association," which depresses the wages of employees). As Hiba Hafiz explained, while the New Deal
architects of the NLRA saw its equal bargaining goal as furthered by industry-wide bargaining, fierce
resistance by employers led to legislative amendments and judicial opinions that narrowed the Act's
"scope to decentralized, single-enterprise bargaining with weak union protections." Hiba Hafiz,
StructuralLabor Rights, 119 MICH. L. REv. 651,673 (2021).
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franchisors, not franchisees, are the parties with meaningful profit margins that
could be redistributed to the workforce during bargaining, they are also the
linchpin to effective collective bargaining and contractual outcomes for labor
unions. Moreover, franchisors can alter franchisee behavior when confronted
with worker organizing, given their significant influence over franchisees
through myriad means, such as franchise agreements, trainings, manuals, and
evaluation tools.' 4 In these ways, the NLRA can only substantively address
inequality of bargaining power in the fast-food industry if franchisors are
considered joint employers (along with the franchisees).
The FLSA offsets inequality of bargaining power and safeguards workers
from poverty with a minimum wage and overtime standard that takes
substandard wages out of competition. The FLSA broadly includes companies
that "suffer or permit" the work in its definition of employers and requires
employers to compensate workers for unpaid wages." Here, too, the joint

employer doctrine is necessary to further the FLSA's remedial and deterrence
goals. Franchisees are often unsophisticated business owners with just one or
two establishments and can be judgment-proof. 6 Franchisors, in contrast, are
often sophisticated companies that train franchisees to operate a store, impose
detailed requirements on franchisees' business practices, and have access to
franchisee business records and employees.' 7 Franchisor standards set most
revenue and cost variables for a franchise store except for labor costs, and they
often impose cost requirements that cut deep into franchisee profit. Franchisees,
as a result, have an incentive to violate underenforced workplace laws to increase

14. See infraPart II.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). The FLSA takes this standard from the child labor laws of the
Progressive Era, extending coverage of the Act to companies that "allow work to be done on theirbehalf
and are in a position to prevent wage and hour abuses, regardless of indirect business relationships and
business formalities." Kati L. Griffith, The FairLabor Standards Act at 80: Everything Old Is New
Again, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 557, 571 (2019).
16. See Robert W. Emerson & Uri Benoliel, Are Franchisees Well-Informed? Revisiting the
Debate over FranchiseRelationship Laws, 76 ALB. L. REV. 193, 205-07, 213 (2013) (summarizing
empirical studies showing that most franchisees are first-time business owners with no experience in the
industry and that franchisees often do not read the franchise disclosure documents and rarely examine
other franchise chains before making their investment); Mark D. Easton, Andrea M. Noack & Leah F.
Vosko, Are FranchiseesMore Prone to Employment Standards Violations than Other Businesses?

Evidencefrom Ontario, Canada, 32 ECON. & LAB. REL. REV. 39, 52-54, 56 (2021). The majority of
franchise owners only own one or two units, and the median income for franchise owners is
approximately $50,000-$75,000. Brandon Gaille, 21 Demographic Statistics of Franchises and
Franchisees, BRANDON GAILLE: SMALL Bus. & MKTG. ADVICE (May 30, 2017),
https://brandongaille.com/19-demographic-statistics-franchises-and-franchisees/
[https://perma.cc/K9Z4-8EAS] (analyzing franchising across industries). Accordingly, employment law
litigation against franchisees can result in liability that far exceeds their capacity to pay. See, e.g., Steven
Greenhouse, Domino's Delivery Workers Settle Suit for $1.3 Million, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/01/nyregion/dominos-franchise-settles-delivery-workers-lawsuitfor-1-28-million.html [https://perma.cc/4LY3-R7L3] (describing wage and hour suit by sixty-one
employees of a Domino's Pizza franchisee that settled for about $1.3 million, resulting in the franchisee
filing for bankruptcy).
17. See infraPart II.
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their profits.1 8 Franchisors that effectively set business practices in franchise
stores and select and train franchisees in them are often the only private
stakeholder that can consistently deter workplace violations, compensate
victims, and make meaningful changes to wages and benefits.19
Despite the importance of holding franchisors jointly responsible for
NLRA and FLSA obligations in franchise stores, joint employer claims against
franchisors usually fail, even if the franchisor is substantially involved in
franchise store operations and substantially influences the nature of fast-food
workers' experiences. 20 The Ninth Circuit's 2019 decision, Salazar v.
McDonald's Corp.,21 is a paradigmatic example. The Ninth Circuit held that

McDonald's (as franchisor) did not jointly employ franchise store employees
along with one of its franchisees. 22 As set out in Salazar, McDonald's required
its franchisee to use a payroll system that only recorded owed overtime if the
employee worked over fifty hours per week.23 This franchisor-required system
caused the franchisee to systematically underpay employees under California's
wage laws. 24 Even though the McDonald's system caused the violation, the
Ninth Circuit minimized the company's responsibility. The court characterized
the franchisor's role as giving "bad tools or bad advice" to the franchisee rather
than acting as a joint employer.25 The Ninth Circuit maintained that McDonald's
was not liable as a joint employer, so long as the franchisor did not directly hire,
fire, or supervise employees. 26 It affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' joint
employer claim against McDonald's as franchisor. 27
Salazaris notable both for its breathtaking implications and its unsurprising
outcome. While a franchisor's participation in a legal violation would seem to
require a finding of joint employment, Salazar holds the opposite. And Salazar

is representative of a dominant thread of case law that exhibits extreme judicial
resistance in the face of franchisor joint employer claims. 28 There are also federal
legislative proposals and state legislation that aim to restrict joint employer
18.

DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY

AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 131 (2014); Easton et al., supra note 16, at 42-44, 50-52,
55; see also MinWoong Ji & David Weil, Does OwnershipStructure Influence Regulatory Behavior?

The Impact of Franchisingon Labor Standards Compliance 3 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Mgmt., Working
Paper
No.
2010-21,
2009),
https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1623387
[https://perma.cc/Z4UB-637R] ("[T]here are high rates of non-compliance in [the fast food]
sector....").
19. See Elmore, supra note 5, at 931-32 (discussing the reputational interests and expertise that
make franchisors well placed to ensure that franchisees comply with employment laws).
20. See infra Part I.A.
21. 944 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2019).
22. Id. at 1027.
23. Id. at 1028.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1030.
26. Id. at 1030-32.
27. Id. at 1027, 1030.
28. Regulatory developments underthe Trump administration mirrored this resistance. See infra
Part I.A.
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liability. 29 This would codify the narrow joint employer standard sought by the
Department of Labor (DOL) and the NLRB during the Trump administration.

This extreme resistance to joint employer claims has enormous
implications for low-wage workers in franchised sectors. Workers in these
sectors are often paid less than the minimum wage, and franchisees often operate
cash-starved businesses with small profit margins. 30 Franchisors, especially after
Salazar, have little incentive to deter future violations of workplace law or even
to ensure that their own policies do not cause them. And franchisee employees
cannot rely on collective bargaining with the franchisee alone to improve
workplace conditions because franchisors effectively set the terms of
employment.
To disrupt the current context, we draw from our own original empirical

analyses as well as literature and doctrine to argue that power, and power
relations between franchisors and franchisees, should be central to the inquiry of
whether the franchisor jointly controls the working conditions of franchisees'
employees. 31 Our empirical work confirms that franchisors' economic power
gives them the capacity to change franchisee behavior-including by reserving
control in franchise agreements, which is known as "reserved control."
Franchisors also can exert "actual control" over working conditions through
relational mechanisms such as manuals, trainings, and monitoring and evaluation
tools. We draw our original empirical evidence from forty-four fast-food
franchise agreements involving leading brands and from a comprehensive
review of documents presented in recent joint employer cases against
McDonald's and Domino's by the NLRB and the New York Attorney General,

respectively. 32 These analyses show the ways franchisor power is baked into
contracts between franchisors and franchisees and how that power operates
through ongoing relations between franchisors and franchisees (and by extension
franchisees' employees). Because of franchisors' contractual power over
franchisees' economic future, franchisees are incentivized to interpret
29. See infra Part I.B for discussion of legislative initiatives to narrow the joint employment
standard. The Save Local Business Act sought to limit joint employer liability to people and companies
that exercise direct control over employees. H.R. 3441, 115th Cong. § 2(a)(2) (2017) (defining a joint
employer as one that "directly, actually, and immediately, and not in a limited and routine manner,
exercises significant control over essential terms and conditions of employment").
30. See WEIL, supra note 18, at 129-31 (noting most fast-food workers experience wage and
hour law violations, which occur more frequently in franchisee-owned stores); Tiffany Hsu & Rachel
Abrams, Subway Got Too Big. Franchisees Paid a Price., N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/28/business/subway-franchisees.html
[https://perma.cc/34H4AJES] (describing cash-starved franchisees unable to bring stores into compliance with franchisor
standards).
31. Our power-as-control construct is consistent with political scientists who view power as a
capacity to change behavior. See, e.g., Marissa Brookes, Power Resources in Theory and Practice:
Where to Go from Here, 9 GLOB. LAB. J. 254, 255 (2018) ("Conceiving of power as a capacity is also
compatible with the notion . . that power is the product of actors' relationships of interdependence,
conditioned by their embeddedness in the economic, institutional and social structures comprising their
external environment.").
32. For a more detailed description of our methodology, see notes infra Part III.
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franchisors' many "recommendations" regarding wage practices and working
conditions as franchisor requirements.
The empirical evidence we present, and the theoretical and doctrinal
underpinnings that support our approach, are significant contributions to the

burgeoning joint employer literature. 33 Moreover, while other scholarship has
proposed alternative liability regimes to address shortcomings in the joint
employer doctrine, 34 our proposal would address these shortcomings without
requiring a significant expansion of existing doctrine or abandoning the central
role of control in the analysis of whether a company has joint employer liability.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we describe the problem the
Article seeks to address. We discuss trends that essentially foreclose joint
employer liability, notwithstanding significant evidence of control. This Section
also illustrates that this foreclosure, in part, is due to "the tortification," 35 or
judicial importation of a restrictive causal nexus requirement, of joint employer
doctrine. We will show that this trend has led courts to discount significant forms
of reserved and exercised control through an intermediary (the franchisee)often called "indirect" control.
Part II presents empirical evidence from an analysis of fast-food contracts
and a systematic review of all publicly available documentation in the
McDonald's and Domino's litigation. It illustrates the reserved control that
emanates from the limits franchisors put on the economic opportunities of their
franchisees. It also spells out the mechanisms of power as control, such as
manuals, trainings, monitoring,

and evaluations.

In this way, franchisors

33. Most joint employer scholarship discusses the history of the doctrine and its modem
applications, but that literature does not attempt an empirical examination of contracts by organizational
forms often involved in joint employment disputes. See, e.g., Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, From
Amazon to Uber: Defining Employment in the Modern Economy, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1673, 1700-03
(2016); Shirley Lung, Exploiting the Joint Employer Doctrine: Providing a Break for Sweatshop
Garment Workers, 34 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 291, 341 (2003); Bruce Goldstein, Marc Linder, Laurence E.
Norton, II & Catherine K. Ruckelshaus, Enforcing FairLabor Standards in the Modern American
Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of Employment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 983 passim

&

(1999). The last systematic empirical examination of franchise contracts in the law literature was by
Gillian Hadfield in 1990. Gillian K. Hadfield, ProblematicRelations: Franchising and the Law of
Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927 (1990). That article sought to show the opportunism in
relational contracts but did not apply this analysis to the joint employment doctrine.
34. See, e.g., Brishen Rogers, Toward Third-PartyLiabilityfor Wage Theft, 31 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 42-46 (2010) (proposing a negligence standard for the joint employment doctrine);
Guy Davidov, Indirect Employment: Should Lead Companies Be Liable?, 37 COMPAR. LAB. L.
POL'Y J. 5, 35 (2015) (proposing a limited form of enterprise liability "based on implicit brand
representations").
35. The term "tortification" came about as a critique of the Supreme Court's use of causation
standards to limit the reach of federal employment discrimination law, particularly after University of
Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013). See Deborah L. Brake, Tortifying
Retaliation:ProtectedActivity at the Intersection of Fault, Duty, and Causation,75 OHIO ST.

L.J. 1375

(2014). This article is the first to identify a similar pattern in joint employer claims, in which courts
require evidence of control beyond what employment and labor laws seem to require. The tort label is
not intended to suggest that the joint employer doctrine adopts common law causation standards. As
explained infra Part IIA, the causal standards in tort law are more flexible than the causation
requirements often imported into the joint employer doctrine.
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indirectly control frontline workers via their directives to their franchisees. A
comprehensive consideration of the contractual relations, and the relations in
practice, shows that franchisees act upon the franchisors' recommendations as
though they were requirements, even if the franchisors formally refer to them as
"recommendations."
Part III provides a theoretical and doctrinal grounding for our proposed
power as control approach. It explores scholarship on franchising that finds that
franchisors hold expansive power in their relationship with franchisees and exert
their power to extract one-sided contract terms. Finally, this Section illustrates
that, in contrast to cases that constrict the scope of joint employment in the
franchising context, there is existing case law in other contexts that supports our
claim that considerations of power should be key to determining who controls
working conditions in joint employer cases.
Part IV operationalizes the power as control approach and shows how it
would further the deterrence, remedial, and collective bargaining goals of labor
and employment law. Lowering the steep hurdles that currently foreclose joint
employer claims would permit low-wage workers and their advocates to
vindicate their rights and pursue collective action. Courts adopting a power as
control approach would find that findings of substantial indirect control can
suffice to demonstrate joint employment. Adoption of our approach should also
encourage the NLRB and other administrative agencies to interrogate franchisorfranchisee relationships in investigating alleged violations of labor and
employment law in the fast-food sector. This Article concludes that this proposed
approach can help courts, administrative agencies, and policy-makers to bring
more justice and consistency to this hotly contested area.
I.
THE PROBLEM: FORECLOSING JOINT EMPLOYMENT IN FRANCHISING

This Section will explain the judicial narrowing of the joint employer
doctrine in cases involving franchisors and show how some legislatures and
agencies have mirrored this trend, which can foreclose joint employment liability
in the franchise relationship. It will demonstrate that the current judicial
approach to joint employer cases involving franchisors is to presume no joint

employment. This has effectively created a safe harbor, precluding franchisor
liability for labor and employment law violations in franchise stores where there
is no evidence of the franchisor's direct hiring, firing, or supervision of
employees. But before we describe what we view as problematic resistance to
joint employer determinations, a few conceptual definitions are necessary.
The lead entities in a vertically integrated production chain can be classified
as joint employers with their subordinate companies if they have sufficient
control over wages and working conditions. 36 We use the word "control" while
36. Temporary staffing and staffing finns and their clients are one example of "typical" joint
employers. See Barfield v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 145 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding
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fully acknowledging that some statutes, like the FLSA, do not speak of control
and are meant to extend coverage beyond common law conceptions of control. 37
Nonetheless, control is the dominant paradigm in discussions of joint
employment, and we adopt the word here for ease so that our approach speaks
broadly to joint employer debates across various labor and employment laws.
The concept of control emanates from common law notions of master-servant
relations and agency theory. 38 For all practical purposes, it means that an entity
is influencing, or could influence, the behavior of another, whether directly or
indirectly. 39

Differentiating between direct control and indirect control is an analytically
slippery endeavor. Generally, direct control requires formal directions, or
explicit instructions to employees that shape wages and working conditions,
often provided through day-to-day, on-site interactions with employees. 40 By
indirect control, we mean two things. First, we mean a franchisor's reserved
power to control wages and working conditions-whether or not it is actually
exercised. This is often referred to as the power to, or the ability to, control. 4 i
Second, we mean exercised control that does not fit into the obvious buckets of
direct controls used by direct supervisors of frontline workers. This would
that a nurse paid by referral agencies was jointly employed by hospital); EEOC Notice No. 915.002,
Enforcement Guidance: Application of EEO Laws to Contingent Workers Placed by Temporary
Employment Agencies and Other Staffing Firms, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N (Dec. 3,

1997), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/enforcement-guidance-application-eeo-laws-contingentworkers-placed-temporary [https://penna.cc/P8MQ-54AM] ("Ifboththe staffing firm and its client have
the right to control the worker, and each has the statutory minimum number of employees, they are
covered as 'joint employers."'); Faushv. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 208, 218-19 (3d Cir. 2015)
(finding and collecting cases in other circuits finding a staffing company to be a joint employer under
Title VII).
37. See Griffith, supra note 15, at 593 (arguing that comprehensive review of the FLSA's
legislative history "dictates forcefully thatthe statute must reach eventhose entities thatbenefit from the
labor and have indirect power over the payment of minimum wage and overtime premiums, regardless
of formalities").
38.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 (AM. L. INST. 2006) (defining an employee as
"an agent whose principal controls or has the right to control the manner and means of the agent's
performance of work").
39. See Salinas v. Com. Interiors, Inc., 848 F.3d 125, 141 (4th Cir. 2017) (stating that "control"
in the employment context speaks to the fundamental question of whether "persons or entities share,
agree to allocate responsibility for, or otherwise codetermine formally or informally, directly or
indirectly the essential terms and conditions of the worker's employment").
40. See, e.g., Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 70 (2d Cir. 2003) (distinguishing
between an employer that exercises direct control and a putative joint employer that "does not hire and
fire its joint employees, directly dictate their hours, or pay them"); Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 633,
639-43 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing distinction between direct and indirect control over employees as
hinging on the extent to which the putative employer has direct contact with employees in hiring, firing,
supervising, and paying them); DiMucci Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 24 F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 1994)
("Factors to consider in determining joint employer status are (1) supervision of employees' day-to-day
activities; (2) authority to hire or fire employees; (3) promulgation of work rules and conditions of
employment; (4) issuance of work assignments; and (5) issuance of operating instructions.").
41. For example, the Sixth Circuit has adopted a version of the common law test that considers
"an entity's ability to hire, fire or discipline employees, affect their compensation and benefits, and direct
and supervise their performance." Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Skanska USA Bldg., Inc., 550
F. App'x 253, 256 (6th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added).
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include, for instance, franchisor instructions that filter through an intermediary,
e.g., a franchisee or franchisee manager, to ultimately affect working conditions
on the front lines. 42 It would also include operational requirements-and
recommendations that are effectively requirements for franchisees to continue to
do business-that shape working conditions. 43
Our definition of "control" narrowly construes direct control and considers
most forms of franchisor control over franchisee store operations to be indirect.
In offering these definitions of direct and indirect control, we do not suggest that
direct control is more powerful than indirect control in all instances or that these
are the only, or the correct, definitions. Neither form of control is necessarily
stronger. Franchisor field representatives' presence in training franchisee
employees about store operations can be a fairly weak form of direct control,
while franchisor threats of franchise termination for failing to comply with those
policies can be a strong form of indirect control. While we characterize the
former as direct control and the latter as indirect control, this distinction can be
porous. Some forms of control, such as supervision through an intermediary,
could be characterized as either. 44
We, nonetheless, distinguish between direct and indirect control in this
Article for two reasons. First, this distinction can be dispositive in determining
whether a company at the top of a vertically integrated production chain, such as
a franchisor, is a joint employer.41 Liability often fundamentally hinges on how
courts construe indirect control. 46 All courts will find a joint employment
42. For example, a putative joint employer, that is, a franchisor, might exert indirect control by
providing operational instructions to franchise store managers. See Kati L. Griffith, An EmpiricalStudy
of Fast-FoodFranchisingContracts:Towards a New "Intermediary"Theory of.Joint Employment, 94
WASH. L. REV. 171, 173-74 (2019) ("[S]ome franchisors may exert considerable influence over the
managers at their franchised stores, who in tun influence front-line workers. In this way, franchisee
managers may serve as intermediaries between franchisor and front-line workers such that, in some
cases, franchisors are joint employers (along with the franchisee) of front-line workers.").
43. See, e.g., Carrillo v. Schneider Logistics Trans-Loading & Distrib., Inc., No. 11-cv-8557,
2014 WL 183956, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2014) (finding that Walmart's "suggestions" to its
subcontractor about how to improve productivity was evidence of indirect control because of Walmart's
expectation that the subcontractor "would follow these suggestions").
44. For example, the NLRB has recently characterized contractor direction of an intermediary,
such as managers of the subcontractor, as a form of direct control. Joint Employer Status Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 11184, 11209 (Feb. 26, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
pt. 103).
45. See, e.g., In re Enterprise Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp. Pracs. Litig., 683 F.3d 462, 46869 (3d Cir. 2012) (distinguishing between "ultimate," or "direct," control over employees and "indirect"
control in determining whether a parent corporation jointly employs its subsidiary's employees, and
cautioning that "the FLSA designates those entities with sufficient indirect control," in addition to
entities with direct control, as joint employers).
46. Appellate courts have reversed trial courts for failure to consider indirect control in a joint
employer analysis. See, e.g., Talarico v. Pub. P'ships, LLC, No. 20-1413, 2020 WL 7137072, at *3-4
(3d Cir. Dec. 7, 2020) (reversing trial court grant of summary judgment for defendant and finding
evidence of indirect control, including required work rules, orientation and training, review of time
sheets, and retention of personnel records, was sufficient to create a genuine dispute aboutjoint employer
status); Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 2003) (vacating judgment in favor of
defendants because district court failed to consider indirect control); Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d
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relationship if there is substantial evidence of direct control.47 While joint
exercise of direct control is routine in some joint employer relationships, such as
between staffing agencies and their clients, 48 it is uncommon in most vertically
integrated settings. 49 Whether labor and employment laws hold liable entities at
the top of a vertically integrated production chain depends on whether and how
courts consider indirect forms of control.
Indirect control is important for all forms of contracting out for endservices, but it is of central importance for franchising because of the extensive
forms of franchisor control over franchisees in franchise agreements, the
extensive operations manuals, the agreements annex, and the means by which
franchisors monitor and enforce their terms. Close examination of indirect
controls is necessary to evaluate the true nature of the relationship. Cumulatively,
indirect control can allow a lead company to effectively control operations and
working conditions at a subsidiary.
A.

CourtResistance to Joint Employment

Even though courts have recognized indirect control in joint employer
analysis,50 courts often discount indirect control and require evidence of direct,
day-to-day supervision of franchise store employees to support a determination
of joint employment.

&

633, 639-41 (9th Cir. 1997) (criticizing the district court for only considering direct control and for
failing to consider defendant's indirect control over farmworkers, which showed that the grower was a
joint employer). Trial courts often, nonetheless, dismiss joint employer claims because of the lack of
direct control.
47. See, e.g., Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 140 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that
individual was a joint employer based on evidence that he hired manager-level employees, "supervised
and controlled employee work schedules and the conditions of employment," and stopped the
misclassification of employees as independent contractors); Scalia v. Liberty Gas Station
Convenience Store, LLC, 444 F. Supp. 3d 390, 401-02 (N.D.N.Y. 2020) (finding that two distinct
companies that shared employees in a single workplace were joint employers); Farmer v. Shake Shack
Enters., LLC, No. 19 Civ. 9425, 2020 WL 4194860, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2020) (denying motion to
dismiss joint employer claim based on evidence of direct control).
48. See, e.g., Baystate Alt. Staffing, Inc. v. Herman, 163 F.3d 668, 680-81 (1st Cir. 1998)
(holding that application of direct control factors showed that temporary employment agencies were
joint employers); Jackson v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 181 F. Supp. 3d 1044, 1062 (N.D. Ga. 2016)
(granting conditional collective action certification in FLSA claim against staffing agencies and Fannie
Mae as joint employers).
49. See, e.g., Jacobsonv. Comcast Corp., 740 F. Supp. 2d 683, 689-94 (D. Md. 2010) (holding
that Comcast did not jointly employ cable technicians because it did not exercise direct control over
hiring and firing, supervision, or pay); Zhao v. Bebe Stores, Inc., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1160-61 (C.D.
Cal. 2003) (finding that garment manufacturer was not a joint employer of garment employees, despite
presence of manufacturer quality control personnel in worksite, because only the contractor directly
controlled employees).
50. See, e.g., Graves v. Lowery, 117 F.3d 723, 727-29 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that a county
jointly employed judicial clerks, even though the court disciplined, fired, and supervised them, because
the employees were covered by the county's personnel policies and were hired and funded by the
county).
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The Fifth Circuit in Orozco v. Plackis is emblematic of this trend." It

considered a minimum wage and overtime claim under the FLSA, which
expressly defines employment more broadly than the common law.5 2 But the
court focused exclusively on the lack of day-to-day supervision by the
franchisor. 53 It dismissed evidence of franchisor meetings with the franchisee, in
which the franchisor recommended staffing and other operational changes that
the franchisee later adopted, as mere "advice" and "suggested improvements"
rather than as evidence of control." The court held that a franchisor's
recommended employee compensation policy did not indicate control, even if
the franchisor reserved the power to require it." It found that the franchisor's
training, policies, and personnel recommendations could not, as a matter of law,
create a joint employment relationship. 56 This was the case because of terms in
the franchise agreement disclaiming franchisor authority over franchisee store
employees.5 7

Recently, some courts have offered a different, more expansive approach
to considering the joint employer status of franchisors. The court in Cano v.
DPNY, Inc. granted a motion to add Domino's Pizza, a franchisor, as a defendant

based on evidence of indirect control.58 As evidence of joint employment, the
plaintiffs alleged that the franchisor's employee compensation policies and
access to the franchisee's pay records showing wage and hour violations
indicated indirect control over the franchisee. 59 Some courts have since adopted
this reasoning in denying motions to dismiss claims against franchisors. 60 They
find that evidence of the franchisor's training, payroll systems, and employment
policies, along with intensive monitoring and inspections, can be sufficient to
defeat a franchisor's motion to dismiss the joint employer claim.61
But these trial court decisions permitting claims to survive if they allege
substantial indirect control are the minority approach in franchising. Like in

51. 757 F.3d 445 (5th Cir. 2014); see also Pope v. Espeseth, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 3d 884, 890-91
(W.D. Wis. 2017), appealdismissed, No. 17-3082, 2018 WL 1738817 (7th Cir. Mar. 21, 2018).
52. The FLSA uses the broader "suffer or permit" standard. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g).
53. Orozco, 757 F.3d at 451.
54. Id at 450.
55. Id at451.
56. Id at 452.
57. Id at 451-52.
58. Cano v. DPNY, Inc., 287 F.R.D. 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
59. Id at257.
60. See, e.g., Parrottv. Marriott Int'l, Inc., No. 17-10359, 2017 WL 3891806, at *10 (E.D. Mich.
Sept. 6, 2017); Lora v. Ledo Pizza Sys., Inc., No. DKC 16-4002, 2017 WL 3189406, at *6 (D. Md. July
27, 2017); Shupe v. DBJ Enters., LLC, No. 14CV308, 2015 WL 790451, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 25,
2015).
61. See Ocampo v. 455 Hosp. LLC, No. 14-CV-9614, 2016 WL 4926204, at *7-9 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 15, 2016); Cordovav. SCCF, Inc., No. 13CIV5665-LTS-HP, 2014 WL 3512838, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
July 16,2014); Olverav. Bareburger Grp. LLC, 73 F. Supp. 3d 201,207 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Bonaventura
v. Gear Fitness One NY Plaza LLC, No. 17 Civ. 2168, 2018 WL 1605078, at *3-5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
29,2018); Benitezv. Demco of Riverdale, LLC, No. 14 Civ. 7074, 2015 WL 803069, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 19, 2015).
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Orozco and Salazar, most trial courts minimize indirect control and adopt narrow
control tests that only credit the exercise of direct, day-to-day supervision of
franchise store employees. 62

The rejection of indirect control as evidence of a joint employer
relationship in In re Jimmy John's Overtime Litigation is an instructive
example. 63 Jimmy John 's involved a FLSA claim for unpaid wages brought by

franchise store employees against the franchisee and franchisor as joint
employers. 64 According to the Jimmy John 's plaintiffs, the fast-food franchisor
provided guidance to franchisees about the hiring process, including advice
about staffing volume, and instructed franchisees to discipline and terminate
employees for violations of franchisor-required personnel standards. 65 But the
court held that evidence that Jimmy John's representatives directed franchisee
staffing levels and schedules did not show the franchisor's role in the interview
process or in the selection of who to hire, "which is the heart of the test." 66 And
evidence that Jimmy John's representatives wanted franchise store employees
removed and gave low evaluation scores for franchisees whose personnel failed
to follow rules was not evidence of control because the franchisor did not play a
role in specific discipline or firing of personnel.67 In rejecting the joint employer
claim, the court held that the franchisor's pervasive control over franchisee
business records and "the systems, operations, and dress code at franchise stores"
was insufficient to establish a joint employment relationship because the
"purpose of these requirements [wa]s not to control franchise employees but to
protect the Jimmy John's Brand Standards that make it a successful business. "68
Many trial courts have followed this familiar pattern. For example, courts
have referred to mandatory employee schedules in franchisor operations manuals
as insufficient to show that the franchisor "control[ed] .

.

. employee work

schedules" because the franchisor did not "enforce the requirements exactly as
listed in the manual," and the franchisee did not follow the manual "in every
instance." 69 Likewise, a commission-based system of compensation that is
dictated in a franchisor's operations manual and that violates wage and hour law

62. See, e.g., Pope v. Espeseth, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 3d 884, 889-91 (W.D. Wisc. 2017)
(granting franchisor's motion for summary judgment), appealdismissed, Pope v. Espeseth. Inc., No. 173082, 2018 WL 1738817 (7th Cir. Mar. 21, 2018); Gessele v. Jack in the Box, Inc., No. 14-CV-1092BR, 2016 WL 7223324, at *21 (D. Or. Dec. 13, 2016) (granting the same); Abdelkhaleq v. Precision
Door, No. 07 CV 03585, 2008 WL 3980339, at *16 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 21, 2008) (granting franchisor's
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss worker's claim); Howell v. Chick-Fil-A, Inc., No. 92-30188, 1993 WL
603296, at *6 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 1993) (granting franchisor's motionfor summary judgment).
63. In re Jimmy John's Overtime Litig., No. 14 C 5509, 2018 WL 3231273 (N.D. Ill. June 14,
2018).
64. See id at *2.
65. Id at *15-18.
66. Id. at *15.
67. Id. at *16.
68. Id. at *20.
69. Pope v. Espeseth, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 3d 884, 890 (W.D. Wis. 2017), appealdismissed, No.
17-3082, 2018 WL 1738817 (7th Cir. Mar. 21, 2018).
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is insufficient to show control because "a recommendation regarding the method
of employee compensation does not, on its own, amount to control over
employees' working conditions." 7 0 Courts have also held that a required
employee background check is a "quality control standard" but does not indicate
power to control. 7 ' One court described a franchisor's payroll services as

"merely a convenience" to franchisees and not evidence of joint employment in
a suit where franchise store employees claimed that their paychecks did not
include owed overtime and meal break compensation. 72 Evidence that a

franchisor required franchise store employees to pass the franchisor's approved
background checks did not show "power to hire" because "the decision as to
which qualified applicants to hire" was ultimately the franchisee's. 73
The day-to-day direct control requirement makes it virtually impossible to
find joint employment in franchising given the vertical organization of
franchisor-franchisee relations. Franchisees mediate the relationship between the
franchisor and the fast-food workforce. One court, reviewing this line of cases,
concluded that "the type of standard setting and oversight exercised by a
franchisor does not rise to the requisite level of control to constitute joint
employer status." 7 4 The purpose of franchising is to contract out for day-to-day
supervision while maintaining extensive operational control. So requiring dayto-day supervision and ignoring indirect control means the joint employer
doctrine does not apply to franchisors in practice. Applied rigidly, it is difficult
to imagine a franchising-or any secondary business-relationship that could
meet this direct supervision requirement.75
Courts are not always clear in their reasons for why they ignore or minimize
evidence of indirect control in franchising. But as the California Supreme Court
in Patterson v. Domino's Pizza, LLC explained, while the "terminology" for

disregarding indirect control "varies . .. courts have focused on the franchisor's
lack of control over the 'instrumentality' . . . that caused the alleged injury. "76
70. Id. at 891.
71. See, e.g., Reese v. Coastal Restoration & Cleaning Sevs., No. 10cv36, 2010 WL 5184841,
at *4 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 15, 2010) (rejecting as evidence of control the provisions in an employee training
program form that authorized franchisor to have access to the results of employee background checks).
72. Singhv. 7-Eleven, Inc., No. C-05-04534, 2007 WL 715488, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2007);
see also Perez v. DNC Parks & Resorts at Sequoia, No. 19-cv-00484, 2020 WL 4344911, at *4 (E.D.
Cal. July 29, 2020) ("[M]erely providing payroll services and meal and rest break policies let alone
sharing or distributing them-does not create a joint employer relationship.").
73. In re Domino's Pizza Inc., No. 16-CV-2492, 2018 WL 4757944, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,
2018).
74. Id at *4.
75. As the majority opinion in Salazar observed, the joint employer analysis applies to
temporary and staffing agencies that place employees in an employer's workplace and in which the
employer exercises the same day-to-day control for the temporary employees as for regular employees.
Salazar v. McDonald's Corp., 944 F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th Cir. 2019). The Salazar court suggested,
however, that this analysis would not apply to temporary and staffing agencies that do not retain power
over hiring and day-to-day control. Id
76. Pattersonv. Domino's Pizza, LLC, 333 P.3d 723, 739 (Cal. 2014); see also, Wu v. Dunkin'
Donuts, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 83, 87 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'd, 4 F. App'x 82 (2d Cir. 2001) ("In deciding
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This causal nexus requirement demands a showing that the defendant controls
"the daily conduct or operation of the particular 'instrumentality' or aspect of the
franchisee's business" alleged to have caused the harm.7 7 An instrumentality
requirement, to be sure, is typical for claims seeking to hold franchisors
vicariously liable for common law claims against franchisees78 and for claims of
franchisor liability for coemployee sexual harassment, like the one in
Patterson.79 As in Patterson, a court analogizing to the common law doctrine of

respondeat superior may impose a causal nexus standard to limit harassment
liability where the principal "could not have prevented the misconduct and
corrected its effects." 8 0
Scholars have criticized this "tortification" of employment discrimination
law for "up[ping] the ante" of what plaintiffs must prove in harassment claims,
beyond what statutes require. 8' As Sandra Sperino explained, the tort label is
misleading because courts that import causal requirements into employment

statutes apply the causal nexus standard less flexibly than tort law would allow. 82
In Patterson, the causal nexus requirement seemed aimed at rejecting the
relevance of the franchisor's "standards and controls" as a means of controlling
employees. 83 The court held that a narrow control test is necessary in franchising
not because tort law requires it, but because "[a]ny other guiding principle would
disrupt the franchise relationship." 8 4 At bottom, judicial resistance to crediting
indirect control in joint employer claims against franchisors seems driven by a

whether a franchisor may be held vicariously liable for acts of its franchisees, courts determine whether
the franchisor controls the day-to-day operations of the franchisee, and more specifically whether the
franchisorexercises a considerabledegree of controlover the instrumentalityat issue in a given case.")
(emphasis added).
77. Kerl v. Dennis Rasmussen, Inc., 2004 WI 86, ¶ 39, 682 N.W.2d 328, 340.
78. See Courtlandv. GCEP-Surprise, LLC, No. CV-12-00349-PHX, 2013 WL 3894981, at *5
(D. Ariz. July 29, 2013) (adopting the instrumentality requirement from Kerl as the "'predominant test'
for holding a franchisor vicariously liable").
79. In Title VII claims, a principal in a vertically integrated production chain is only liable "if
the defendant employer knew or should have known about the other employer's conduct and 'failed to
undertake prompt corrective measures within its control."' U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v.
Glob. Horizons, Inc., 915 F.3d 631, 641 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting EEOC Notice No. 915.002, supra note
36.
80. Patterson,333 P.3d at 739.
81. Stephanie Bomstein, Reckless Discrimination,105 CALIF. L. REV. 1055, 1091 (2017).
82. See Sandra F. Sperino, The Tort Label, 66 FLA. L. REv. 1051, 1086-87 (2014). Res ipsa
loquitur, for example, is a commonly accepted doctrinal tool courts rely on to relax the factual causation
requirement when negligence is clear, but it is difficult to prove that the untaken precaution caused the
loss. See Mark F. Grady, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Compliance Error, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 887, 916-20
(1994) (identifying a class of "nondurable negligence" cases in which specific negligence cannot be
shown, and which is therefore "obliged to rely on res ipsa loquitur"). Likewise, the loss of chance
doctrine permits claims in which a patient with a less than 50 percent chance of recovery may
nonetheless satisfy causation for clear medical malpractice that made survival less likely. See David A.
Fischer, Tort RecoveryforLoss ofa Chance, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 605, 627-35 (2001) (explaining
deterrence justification of loss of chance doctrine, and its criticisms).
83. Patterson,333 P.3d at 733.
84. Id at739.
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fear of imposing "virtually unlimited liability" on franchisors that institute
uniform brand standards. 85
We will return to the judicial concern about unbounded liability for
franchisors in Part IV. For now, our purpose is to show how this exclusion of
franchise standards and controls from evidence of joint employment has
implications for any joint employer claim in a franchise relationship. Courts have
applied the reasoning of Pattersonto claims, such as wage and hour claims, in
which the franchisor has constructive knowledge of the violations.8 6 Even where
a causal nexus is established, like the McDonald's required payroll program that
underreported owed wages in Salazar, courts routinely reject the claim. 87 In
these instances, the direct control requirement that disregards even "a
franchisor's expansive control over a franchisee" 88 means that joint employer
theories in franchising cases are essentially foreclosed. This defeats the purpose
of labor and employment law by permitting franchisors to effectively control
operations while ignoring legal violations that they have notice of and have the
ability to cure.
B.

Agency/Legislative Resistance to Joint Employment

Agency interpretation under the Trump administration and some state-level
legislation has tracked the judiciary's narrowing of the joint employer test for
franchisors in labor and wage and hour law. While there has been no federal
statutory change, attempts to account for the power that franchisors have over
franchisees have met intense opposition in many state legislatures and
administratively. While the Biden administration will likely, as we propose, seek
to restore a broader interpretation of joint employment similar to that held by
agencies during the Obama administration, it is unclear how durable any future
agency action will be. Meanwhile, courts will likely continue their foreclosure
of joint employer claims.
85. Chavez v. McDonald's Corp., No. 19-cv-00164-PAB-SKC, 2020 WL 1322864, at *5 (D.
Colo. Mar. 20, 2020) (quotingMcKinnon v. YUM! Brands, Inc., No. 15-cv-00286, 2017 WL 3659166,
at *9 (D. Idaho Aug. 24, 2017)) (dismissing Section 1981 claim by customer against McDonald's for
alleged discriminatory conduct by franchisee).
86. See In re Domino's Pizza Inc., No. 16-CV-2492, 2018 WL 4757944, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
30, 2018) (citing Patterson,333 P.3d at 728 in an FLSA joint employer claim against franchisor for the
proposition that "evidence of corporate guidance in the hiring process is insufficient to demonstrate that
a franchisor has power to hire a franchisee's employees"); In re Jimmy John's Overtime Litig., No. 14
C 5509, 2018 WL 3231273, at *15 (N.D. Ill. June 14, 2018) (citing Patterson,333 P.3d at 728 for the
proposition that "a showing of corporate guidance in the hiring process, without any personal
involvement in the hiring decisions of individuals seeking employment at a [franchise store], is
insufficient to demonstrate that [a franchisor] controls the selection of franchise employees").
87. See, e.g., Perez v. DNC Parks & Resorts at Sequoia, No. 19-cv-000484, 2020 WL 4344911,
at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 29, 2020) (relying on Patterson, 333 P.3d at 739 to dismiss wage and hour law
claim against franchisor because "merely providing payroll services and meal and rest break policies . .
does not create a joint employer relationship").
88. Jacobsonv. Comcast Corp., 740 F. Supp. 2d 683, 690 n.6 (D. Md. 2010) ("Courts evaluating
franchise relationship[s] for joint employment have routinely concluded that a franchisor's expansive
control over a franchisee does not create a joint employment relationship [on its own].").
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Under the Obama administration, the two executive agencies in charge of
enforcing labor and employment law-the DOL and the NLRB 89-broadly
interpreted the joint employer standard. Obama's Wage and Hour Administrator
at the DOL, David Weil, acknowledged the need to examine supply chain
realities and the "fissured" nature of business relationships among multiple
businesses in his enforcement strategies. 90 In 2014, the General Counsel of the
NLRB sued McDonald's and its franchisees alleging that these joint employers
violated employees' rights to engage in collective activities to support the Fight
for Fifteen movement. 91 Then, in Browning-FerrisIndustries of California,Inc.,

the NLRB ruled that reserved control in contractual arrangements and indirect
control over workplace standards could show joint employment status. 92 It found
that the "right to control, in the common-law sense, is probative of jointemployer status, as is the actual exercise of control, whether direct or indirect." 93
Joint employer developments during the Obama administration led to
administrative and legislative backlash, with a high-profile push by the business
community to narrow the scope of joint employer law. 94 Government agencies
89. Unique among agencies regulating the workplace, the NLRB shapes labor law by
determining whether a complaint proceeds and by announcing its new interpretations of labor law in the
administrative appeal process. The NLRB Office of General Counsel decides which cases the Board
hears, and the Board rules on substantive labor law questions through its case determinations. See 29
U.S.C. §§ 153(d), 160. While subject to judicial review, these rules shift in predictable ways from liberal
to conservative administrations. See Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in
Administrative Law Exile: Problems with Its Structure and Function and Suggestionsfor Reform, 58
DUKE L.J. 2013, 2015 (2009).
90. David Weil, Strategic Enforcement in the FissuredWorkplace, in WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE
AND WHO IS THE EMPLOYER?: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 68TH ANNUAL

CONFERENCE ON LABOR 19, 19 (Kati L. Griffith & Samuel Estreicher eds., 2015).
91. Hassan A. Kanu, McDonald's Gets Win in Labor Case Backed by Fightfor $15(2), Daily
Lab. Rep. (BL) (Dec. 12, 2019), https://bnanews.bna.com/employee-benefits/mcdonalds-gets-win-inmajor-labor-case-backed-by-fight-for-15? [https://penna.cc/NU4U-XG9G]; Michael Rose, NLRB
Announces Six More Complaints IssuedAgainst McDonald's on JointEmployer Issue, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BL) (February 13, 2015), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/bloomberglawnews/dailylabor-report/ (search in the search bar for "Michael Rose" "McDonald's"; then click "Go"; then scroll
down to the fifth result) [https://penna.cc/5F85-RLBD] ("In July 2014, NLRB General Counsel Richard
F. Griffin said he had authorized regional directors to issue complaints in 43 ULP cases involving
McDonald's. He then issued 13 complaints in December 2014."); Steven Greenhouse, McDonald's
Ruling
Could
Open
Door for
Unions,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
29,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/business/ntrb-holds-mcdonads-not-just-franchisees-liable-forworker-treatment.html [https://perma.cc/V9M2-GJ4W].
92. 362 N.L.R.B. 1599, 1614 (2015), aff'd, 911 F.3d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
93. Id
94. See Justin Miller, Can Big Business Dismantle the Joint Employer Standard?, AM.
PROSPECT (June 21, 2016), https://prospect.org/labor/can-big-business-dismantle-joint-employerstandard/ [https://perma.cc/SPM8-WSXG] (reporting employer legal mobilization against the
Browning-Ferrisstandard); Opinion, NLRB's Joint Employer Attack, WALL ST. J.(Aug. 28, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/nlrbs-joint-employer-attack-1440805826
[https://perma.cc/6K5CWZCV] (arguing that Browning-Ferrisis an example of agency overreach); Erin Conway & Caroline
Fichter, Surviving the Tempest: Franchiseesin the Brave New World of JointEmployers and $15 Now,
35 FRANCHISE L.J. 509, 515 (2016) ( "[The] change in the NLRB employer test is vehemently opposed
by the International Franchise Association (IFA) and bemoaned as the end of franchising altogether by
some."); David J. Kaufmann, Felicia N. Soler, Breton H. Permesly & Dale A. Cohen, A FranchisorIs
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under the Trump administration flatly rejected this broader view of joint
employer liability. The DOL and NLRB repudiated those positions and restricted
the scope of joint employer liability. 95 In December 2019, the NLRB approved

a franchisor-friendly settlement of its General Counsel's joint employer case
against McDonald's, and its General Counsel then declined to pursue charges
against McDonald's for violations in stores owned by its closely held
subsidiary. 96 In 2018, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the reasoning
of Browning-Ferris,97 even as the NLRB overturned it through the issuance of a
rule, returning to a narrow scope of joint employment. 98 The NLRB's Trump-

era rule defined the "'share or codetermine' standard" to require a showing of
"'possession and exercise of substantial direct and immediate control over one
or more essential terms and conditions of employment.

"'99

Meanwhile, the Trump-era DOL in 2020 promulgated a rule similar to that
of the NLRB's, narrowing the scope of the FLSA.' 00 The DOL refrained from
concluding that indirect control can never be sufficient to establish a joint
employer relationship. Its rule contemplated that a putative joint employer that
"determine[s] how employees' schedules, routes, or other working conditions
will be altered or changed" to meet its own needs weighs in favor of a joint
employer finding.101 But, like the NLRB, the DOL opined that there is nothing
about the franchise relationship that makes "joint employer status more
likely." 0 2 In September 2020, a district court invalidated the DOL's new,
Not the Employer ofIts Franchiseesor Their Employees, 34 FRANCHISE L.J. 439 passim (2015) (arguing
franchisors' position that franchisors should not be considered joint employers).
95. See Joint Employer Status Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 2820, 2823
(proposed Jan. 16, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 791) (DOL rule narrowly interpreting joint
employer rule for FLSA and clarifying that franchising as a form of contracting does "not make joint
employer status more . . likely"); Joint Employer Status Under the National Labor Relations Act, 85
Fed. Reg. 11184, 11187, 11198 (Feb. 26, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 103) (NRLB overruling
Browning-Ferrisand finding that joint employment is established "only if the two entities share or
codetermine the employees' essential terms and conditions of employment," which does not include the
"brand standards" of a franchising relationship); see also Recission of Joint Employer Status Under the
Fair Labor Standards Act, 86 Fed. Reg. 14038 (Mar. 12, 2021) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 791).
96. See Hassan A. Kanu, McDonald'sLaborBoard RulingAttacked on Ethics Grounds, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BL) (January 7, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/mcdonalds-caseshould-be-reopened-on-ethics-grounds-lawyers [https://perma.cc/28EM-KFBW]; Ian Kullgren, JointEmployer QuestionsRaised in New NLRB McDonald's Case, Daily Lab. Rep. (BL) (Sept. 23, 2020),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-reporl/joint-employer-questions-raised-in-new-nrbmcdonalds-case [https://perma.cc/9R7J-Z48G].
97. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.3d 1195, 1200, 1217-21 (D.C. Cir.
2018) (affirming that indirect control is relevant when related to "essential terms and conditions of
employment").
98. Joint Employer Status Under the National Labor Relations Act, 85 Fed. Reg. at 11184.
99. Id. at 11186, 11198.
100. Joint Employer Status Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 85 Fed. Reg. at 2820. This rule
superseded informal guidance by the DOL in January 2016, which more broadly interpreted the FLSA
joint employer standard. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Administrator Interpretations
Letter on Joint Employment Under the Fair Labor Standards Act and Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural
Worker Protection Act (Jan. 20, 2016).
101. Joint Employer Status Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 85 Fed. Reg. at 2841.
102. Id
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narrower interpretation as inconsistent with the FLSA's broad definitions of the
employment relationship. 103
Franchisors, through the International Franchise Association (IFA), have
sought to extend and codify Trump-era administrative rules narrowing joint
employment standards for franchisors.1 04 While this has had limited effect in
advancing federal legislation, 05 eighteen states have amended their employment

laws to exclude franchisors from joint employer liability altogether.1 06
Despite the Biden administration's move to return to Obama-era rules
regarding joint employment,1

07

and despite the Democratic majority in the

Senate, courts are likely to continue to foreclose joint employer claims. Even if
federal agencies start to pursue joint employer claims in franchising cases
aggressively, they are likely to face resistance in the courts. The joint employer
status of franchisors under federal law is likely to remain in judges' and agencies'
discretion, and a good number of states are likely to continue their efforts to
narrow the scope of joint employment liability. With that reality in mind, we join
other scholars in rejecting the need to show direct, day-to-day control in a joint
employer relationship.1 08 This direct control requirement is contrary to
established law and would defeat the legislative purpose of labor and
employment statutes.1 09

We agree with Brishen Rogers and Guy Davidov's critiques of narrow
constructions of the scope of joint employer responsibility. Drawing from tort
principles, Rogers argued in favor of replacing the right-to-control test with a

negligence standard for the joint employer doctrine.11 0 A negligence standard
would hold principals co-liable for the employment law violations of

103. New York v. Scalia, 20-cv-01689, 2020 WL 5370871, at *34 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2020).
104. Megan R. Wilson, FranchisersBlitz Congressin Search ofLiability Shield, HILL (Mar. 14,
2018), https://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/business-a-lobbying/378447-franchisers-blitz-congressin-search-of-liability [https://perma.cc/9WJ4-8DJG]; Allison R. Grow & Adrienne L. Saltz,
Effectiveness ofthe LegislativeResponse to Joint Employer Liability, 37 FRANCHISE L.J. 349 (2018).
105. Shortly after the Browning-Ferris decision, which revived the broad joint employer
standard, the U.S. House of Representatives introduced a bill, called the "Save Local Business Act,"
which was not taken up by the Senate. It purported to effectively write joint employers like franchisors
out of the scope of the NLRA and the FLSA. Save Local Business Act, H.R. 3441, 115th Cong. (2017).
106. Mani von Wilpert, States with Joint-Employer Shield Laws Are Protecting Wealthy
CorporateFranchisersat the Expense ofFranchiseesand Workers, ECON. POL'Y INST. (Feb. 13, 2018),

http://epi.org/142015 [https://perma.cc/C4GV-AC5B]. Texas, for example, "exclud[es] a franchisor as
an employer of a franchisee or a franchisee's employees." S. 652, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015).
107. See Rescission of Joint Employer Status Under the Fair Labor Standards Act Rule, 86 Fed.
Reg. 40939 (July 30, 2021) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 791); Ben Penn, DOL Proposes Ditching
Trump's Narrowed Joint Employer Rule, Daily Lab. Rep. (BL) (March 11, 2021),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/biden-dol-proposes-ditching-trumps-narrowedjoint-employer-rule [https://perma.cc/YPD7-3JKE].
108. See, e.g., Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 33, at 1705-07; Goldstein et al., supra note 33,
at 1011-13.
109. See, e.g., Griffith, supranote 15, at 588 (uncovering in the legislative history of the FLSA a
"concerted effort to reduce incentives for businesses to splinter, or 'fissure,' in an effort to avoid the
FLSA's grasp").
110. Rogers, supra note 34, at 42-46.
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subcontractors if the "violations are often both foreseeable and preventable.""'
Davidov proposed a different standard that would operate as a limited form of
enterprise liability, "based on implicit brand representations.""1 2 But proposals
to extend joint employer liability must contend with the considerable political
obstacles to broadening the standard of liability in franchising.
Recognizing the judicially entrenched nature of foreclosing joint employer
claims against franchisors and the administrative volatility of the issue, we will
argue in the next Section that advancing the goals of the NLRA and FLSA and
securing the rights of franchise workers will require a new approach.
II.
POWER AS CONTROL IN PRACTICE

Our empirical work reveals the power imbalance between franchisors and
franchisees and how that power translates into franchisor control over the
working conditions of franchisee employees. It exposes forms of control
commonly reserved (unexercised) as well as forms of control commonly
exercised by franchisors. Armed with the power to end the franchisees' business
and often to restrict franchisees' business opportunities, franchisors have
substantial unexercised control-they can change wages and working conditions
if they choose to do so."1 3 Franchisors also exercise their power over franchisees
through sunk costs, including substantial fees and other mandated expenses for
such things as remodeling and advertising that "can range into the hundreds of
thousands of dollars.""

4

Franchisors exert exercised control through a variety of

means including their "recommendations" to franchisees and franchisee
managers. These recommendations are communicated through mechanisms such
as manuals, training, monitoring, and evaluation." The economic dependence
on franchisors and extensive monitoring raise at least suspicions that franchisees
will understand and follow franchisor recommendations with respect to the
working conditions of their staff as if they were requirements. This is the case

111. Id at 6, 46. Aditi Bagchi made a similar proposal comparing the tort liability regime of
manufacturers for defective products to employment law violations in a production chain. See Aditi
Bagchi, Production Liability, 87 FORDHAM L. REv. 2501, 2519 (2019) (arguing that "a retailer is
responsible for the accidents, working conditions, or employment terms under which its goods are
produced if those consequences of its supplier contracts are foreseeable and could be avoided by
different contractual terms").
112. Davidov, supranote 34, at 35. Elmore has also previously argued in favor of liability outside
of the joint employer doctrine entirely, grounded in the tort doctrines of apparent agency and
misrepresentation. See Elmore, supra note 5, at 947-49.
113. Elmore, supra note 5, at 919-22 (arguing that franchisees' inexperience, lack of
sophistication, and sunk costs in operating a franchise store, coupled with franchisors' intensive
inspections and monitoring of stores and power to unilaterally terminate the franchise agreement,
"collectively permit the franchisor to ensure that franchisees adopt its required and recommended
policies without exerting direct control").
114. Id at 920; see also Hadfield, supra note 33, at 951-52 (explaining that "the risk that
franchisors will extract sunk costs makes opportunism a central concern for franchisees").
115. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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even when contracts explicitly state that the franchisee, not the franchisor, is
solely responsible for wages and working conditions of employees. In other
words, the power imbalance between the franchisor and franchisee influences
how a franchisee interprets a franchisor "recommendation."
Franchisors' power to control is embedded into the very structure of the
franchising business model. Franchisors have a strong incentive to provide
comprehensive "recommendations" that relate to how workers perform their
work because franchisees' interests in reducing costs are not in line with
franchisors' broader interest in a reliable view of the brand. Economists have
long shown how franchisor efforts to promote the brand through franchise stores
can result in misaligned interests of franchisors and franchisees, particularly over
time."1 6 Franchisees have a free-rider interest in maximizing profit by attracting
customers with the franchisor's brand name while cutting costs by shirking on
franchisor standards that reduce profit." 7 But free riding by franchisees may
associate the franchisor with an inferior product or service."1 8 Franchisors, in
contrast, have an incentive to maximize store revenue and build customer
loyalty.11 9 Franchisors may seek to impose requirements on franchisees
opportunistically, even if they run counter to the reasonable expectations of
franchisees and cut deep into franchisees' profits.12 Franchisors also may enact
extensive, uniform operational requirements, which they incorporate in franchise
agreements as "operations manual[s],"121 to remove the discretion from
franchisees to pursue their own interests.1 22
The power that franchisors wield over franchisees through limits on
economic opportunities and through recommendations that are interpreted as
requirements can harm workers. Franchisors can steer franchisees to focus on
116. Economists have historically examined the franchise relationship from an "agency costs"
perspective. This perspective suggests that entities choose franchising to coordinate their production
process to deter "shirking" by delegating monitoring to franchisees, who, in return for reducing
employee shirking, may claim the residual profit. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz,
Production,Information Costs, andEconomic Organization,62 AM. ECON. REV. 777,782-83,790 n.15
(1972); June Carbone & Nancy Levit, The Death of the Firm, 101 MINN. L. REV. 963, 995 (2017);
Thomas S. Ulen, The Coasean Firm in Law and Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301, 310 (1993).
117. See Francine Lafontaine & Emmanuel Raynaud, Residual Claims and Self-Enforcement as
Incentive Mechanisms in FranchiseContracts: Substitutes or Complements?, in THE ECONOMICS OF
CONTRACTS: THEORIES AND APPLICATIONS 315, 324 (Eric Brousseau & Jean-Michel Glachant eds.,
2002); see also Steven C. Michael, The Effect of OrganizationalForm on Quality: The Case of
Franchising, 43 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 295, 298-99 (2000) (arguing that free riding prevents
franchise store from providing the same quality as other corporate forms).
118.

See JEFFREY L. BRADACH,

FRANCHISE ORGANIZATIONS

10-11

(1998); see also

MinWoong Ji & David Weil, The Impact of Franchisingon Labor Standards Compliance, 68 INDUS.
& LAB. RELS. REv. 977, 979 (2015) (noting that reputational factors cause franchisees to be more
willing to violate hygiene codes than company-owned restaurants); Hadfield, supra note 33, at 948-55
(arguing that the franchising relationship is an obstacle to quality control for the franchisor).
119. See Lafontaine & Raynaud, supra note 117, at 317-19.
120. Hadfield, supranote 33, at 952 (explaining that a franchisor may opportunistically raise the
prices it charges franchisees for goods or require unnecessary renovations to boost store revenue).
121. Id. at 943.
122. See WEIL, supra note 18, at 66-71.
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intensively monitoring workers' speed and quantity of work instead of pursuing
more equitable productivity strategies, such as raising wages or improving

employee skills.1 23 Franchisees can respond to intensive franchisor monitoring
and tight profit margins by unlawfully chiseling wages as the only cost variable
that the franchisor does not directly monitor.1 24 Franchisor pressure can
sometimes lead franchisees to violate employment law,1 25 and franchisor anti-

poaching restrictions and similar restraints can drive wage stagnation.1 26
A.

Limits on Franchisees'Economic Opportunities

Most franchisees begin the franchise relationship in a state of dependency
on the franchisor, as they tend to own only one or two franchise stores and have
little previous business experience.1 27 Franchisors leverage this dependency to
limit the ongoing and future economic opportunities of their franchisees, which
further sets the stage for franchisor power over franchisees and their store's
working conditions. To illustrate the role of franchisors' ex ante restrictions on
franchisees, we draw both from our contractual analyses of leading franchisorfranchisee contracts in fast-food1 28 and our deep dive into the recent McDonald's
123.

Brian Callaci, What Do FranchiseesDo? Vertical Restraints as Workplace Fissuringand

LaborDiscipline Devices, 1 J.L. POL. ECON. 397, 398-99 (2021).
124. David Weil similarly argued that franchising "can create incentives that simultaneously
demand adherence to product quality and create incentives for franchisees to violate laws." WEIL, supra
note 18, at 9.
125. See Elmore, supra note 5, at 927-32.
126. Alan Krueger and Orley Ashenfelter found that most major franchisors required franchisees
to agree to no-poaching terms, effectively restraining franchise store employees from transferring from
one franchisee to another. Alan B. Krueger & Orley Ashenfelter, Theory and Evidence on Employer
Collusion in the FranchiseSector (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working PaperPaper No. 24831, 2018),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/workingpapers/w24831/w24831.pdf
[https://penna.ccIW3DGUG64]. Brian Callaci argued that "vertical restraints," such as supplier restrictions and mandatory hours
of operation, reduce the bargaining power of franchisees and their employees and take "virtually
everything but labor costs and labor discipline out of the franchisee's profit maximizing choice set,"
encouraging franchisees "to adopt a labor management strategy of minimizing the wage bill and
extracting high levels of labor effort . . over possible alternative strategies." Callaci, supra note 123, at
398-99. Antitrust scholars have theorized that these types of vertical restraints that restrict franchise
store employees can contribute to wage stagnation. Generally, franchisors, by restraining franchise store
employment, exercise classic monopsony power, which is associated with lower employee wages.
Suresh Naidu & Eric A. Posner, Labor Monopsony and the Limits of the Law (Jan. 13, 2019)
https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3365374
(unpublished
manuscript),
[https://perma.cc/T42X-QF9U]; Samuel Muehlemann, Paul Ryan & Stefan C. Wolter, Monopsony
Power, Pay Structure and Training (Mar. 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://ftp.iza.org/dp5587.pdf

[https://perma.cc/7M56-VDZK].
127.
128.

Elmore, supra note 5, at 922 n.61.
Researchers retrieved forty-four contracts from the two government sources that have

contracts publicly available: Commerce Actions and Regulatory Documents Search, MINN. COM.

DEP'T,

https://www.cards.commerce.state.mn.us/CARDS/

Franchise

Search,

WIsc.

DEP'T

[https://perma.cc/CBS8-LUEQ]
OF

FIN.

and
INSTS.,

https://www.wdfi.org/apps/FranchiseSearch/MainSearch.aspx
[https://perma.cc/D246-V4T7].
We
searched for contracts for the top fifty brands listed in a leading trade publication. The QSR 50, QSR
MAG., https://www.qsrmagazine.com/content/qsr50-2017-top-50-chart
[https://perma.cc/MMX8HGR7]. We located forty-four, rather than fifty contracts, because some brands do not franchise (for
example, Starbucks, Chipotle, White Castle, Boston Market, and In-n-Out Burger) and some did not
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and Domino's litigation documentation.1 29 A franchisee's costs spent operating

stores in the franchisor's brand, coupled with a franchisor's ability to terminate
or refuse to renew the contract and to restrict a franchisee's outside business
ventures, puts a franchisee in a position of economic dependence.
1.

Termination and Renewal

Franchisors reserve expansive rights to terminate the franchise contract and
to refuse renewal of the contract in the future. Both of these powers, if exercised,
vanquish franchisees' investments in the business and often years of their effort.
As Table 1 illuminates, thirty-four of the contracts we surveyed give the
franchisor, not the franchisee, broad power to terminate the contract. Most of
these contracts provide franchisees with some assurance that they will get a
chance to "cure" the problem but leave the ultimate authority to terminate the
business relationship in the franchisors' hands.1 30 The remaining ten contracts
give franchisees some, but very limited, rights to terminate the contract. Seven
of these ten more franchisee friendly provisions allow a franchisee to terminate
only if the franchisor fails to cure a material breach.131 Nonetheless, even these
ten hardly reflect an equally portioned right. The franchisee, but not the
franchisor, is subject to a vast array of rules, which, if violated, could trigger a
termination.1 32 Since the franchisor has very few contractual obligations, there

have files available in Minnesota or Wisconsin. At the time the research was conducted, 2016 was the
most recent year available through these publicly available sources. The top fifty brands account for
nearly the entire market. Jeff Feingold, Krispy Kreme Rebounds in UNH FranchiseIndex, N.H. BUS.
REV. (June 8, 2006), http://www.nhbr.com/May-26-2006/Krispy-Kreme-rebounds-in-UNH-franchiseindex/ [https://perma.cc/CDW6-K7LH].
129. Researchers located all of the documentation available in both cases. Once the
documentation was aggregated, researchers developed a spreadsheet with a variety of categories of
interest, including wages, trainings, staffing, evaluations, inspections, and others. Researchers then
systematically reviewed all of the documentation and filled in the spreadsheet with all relevant
information available on each theme.
130. Our findings are consistent with Hadfield's study. See Hadfield, supra note 33, at 944
(characterizing termination as in franchisor hands, with some room for the franchisee to cure).
131. Jersey Mike's Franchise Sys., Inc., Franchise Agreement (Franchise Disclosure Document,
Exhibit B) § 17.1, at 25 (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.franchimp.com/?page=pdf&f=107143_2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CPV3-NV32]; Jimmy John's Franchise, LLC, Franchise Agreement (Franchise
Disclosure Document, Exhibit B) § 14(A), at 53-54 (Apr. 20, 2016) (on file with authors); Papa
Murphy's Int'l LLC, Form of Franchise Agreement (Franchise Disclosure Document, Exhibit D) § 7.2,
at 28 (Mar. 2016) (on file with authors); Steak N Shake Enters., Inc., Unit Franchise Agreement
(Franchise Disclosure Document, Exhibit J) § 11.1(C), at 59 (2016) (on file with authors); Culver
Franchising Sys., Inc., Franchise Agreement (Franchise Disclosure Document Exhibit B) § 18, atB-23
(Mar. 29 2016), https://www.franchimp.com/?page-pdf&f=106989_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/GS3JBWXT]; Am. Dairy Queen Corp., DQ Treat Operating Agreement (Franchise Disclosure Document,
Exhibit B) § 13.3, at 32 (Dec. 20, 2016) (on file with authors); Domino's Pizza Franchising LLC,
Standard Franchise Agreement (Franchise Disclosure Document, Exhibit E) § 18.1, at 26 (Jan. 2013)
(on file with authors).
132. Hadfield, supra note 33, at 943 ("[C]onsider the great weighting of the clauses towards the
obligations of the franchisee. Nearly all of the clauses pertain to commitments made by the
franchisee .... On the other hand, the franchisor's contractual obligations extend only to training, to
advertising, and to the provision of an exclusive territory. Ongoing management support, promised in
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are narrow circumstances whereby a franchisor could materially breach the
contract. One of the only contractual promises that some franchisors provide is
that they will not grant a license to another franchisee within a particular
geographical boundary around the franchisee's store.1 33 What the contractual
analysis of this term communicates is that the franchisor, not the franchisee,
holds most of the power of termination.
Table 1: Termination and Renewal Contractual Provisions*
Type of Provision

Number of Contracts

Termination: Franchisor Exclusive Power

34

Termination: Franchisee Power If Franchisor Breaches

10

Renewal: Franchisor Exclusive Power

41

Renewal: Franchisee Power to Renew with Conditions

3

* Total number of contracts reviewed=44

The contracts tell a similar story of power imbalance with respect to
contract renewal provisions. The majority of contracts (forty-one of forty-four)
give franchisors the sole discretion to decide whether to renew a contract at the
end of the existing contract term. Some contracts are quite explicit about the
expansiveness of the franchisor's sole discretion over renewal decisions. For
instance, Jack in the Box's agreement "makes no assurance of the granting of a
new license at expiration,"1 34 and Taco Bell's contract states that the franchisee
"shall have no expectation or right to continue."1 35 The three that provide
franchisees with some discretion over their renewal right typically condition
renewal on compliance with the contract, up-to-date payments, franchisorapproved renovations, and notice within a specified period of time.
The fate of the contract is of great importance to franchisees who have
invested significant time and resources into their stores. The testimony in the
about half the contracts, is normally discretionary. Few franchisors undertake firm obligations with
regard to the nature, extent, and quality of advertising.").
133. See, e.g., Checkers Drive-In Restaurants, Inc., Franchise Agreement (Franchise Disclosure
Document,
Exhibit
B)
§ 2.02,
at
6-7
(Apr.
1,
2016),
https://www.franchimp.con/?page-pdf&f=106902_2016.pdf [https://penna.cc/LVP2-A9DQ] ("[W]e
will not operate .. .or grant to a third party the right to operate, any "Checkers" or "Rally's" branded
restaurant located within a particular geographic area .... ").
134. Jack in the Box Inc., Franchise Agreement (Franchise Disclosure Document, Exhibit J-1)
§ 1, at 2 (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.franchimp.com/?page=pdf&f=107134_2017.pdf

[https://perma.cc/H8YP-B3NW].
135. Taco Bell Corp., Franchise Agreement (Franchise Disclosure Document, Exhibit B-1) § 2,
https://www.franchimp.com/?page=pdf&f=107446_2016.pdf
at
2
(Mar.
25,
2016),
[https://perma.cc/KGC5-59V3]; see also Chick-fil-A, Inc., Franchise Agreement § 2.7, at 4 (Mar. 26,
2016) (on file with authors) ("In the event of [termination or expiration], Chick-fil-A shall have the right
to designate one of such Additional Businesses as the Initial Business for purposes of either (i)
continuing under this Agreement; or (ii) requiring the Operator to enter into a new Franchise
Agreement.").
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NYAG-Domino's
and
NLRB-McDonald's
litigation
confirms
overwhelming power of franchisors over termination and renewal.

the
The

Domino's documentation illustrates that franchisees tend to interpret franchisor
power over termination and renewal as more powerful than even the contractual
language invites. For example, the Domino's termination provision sets out a list

of scenarios that would justify the franchisor's termination of the contract.1 36
Franchisees widely interpret this contractual provision, however, as broadly
allowing the franchisor to terminate the contract "at its discretion."1 37
The McDonald's contract is silent on renewal processes, but the trial
documentation clarifies that McDonald's wields its expansive power over
franchisees' future business opportunities. McDonald's, as franchisor, does
extensive evaluations before deciding whether to allows a franchisee to renew
its contract.1 38 McDonald's regularly denies opportunities for growth to
franchisees, even to the group of franchisees that have successfully complied
with all franchisor-established benchmarks.1 39
2.

Noncompete Restrictions

Beyond termination and renewal, franchisors wield considerable
contractual power to restrict franchisees' economic opportunities through
noncompete restrictions. There has been a lot of press and scholarly focus on nopoach clauses and the ways that franchisors restrict franchisees from hiring the
employees of other franchisees within the brand. 4 Here, we highlight franchisor
136. Domino's Pizza Franchising LLC, supranote 131, § 18, at 26-28.
137. See Exhibit 14 to Affirmation of Terry Gemstein at 131, James v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., No.
450627/16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 2016), NYSCEF No. 22 [hereinafter Denman Testimony] (quoting
franchisee Matthew J. Denman as testifying on December 4, 2013 that if a franchisee fails to correct
problems, "[y]ou canbe in default, and they can terminate your contract"); Exhibit 22 to Affirmation of
Terry Gernstein at 2, Domino's, No. 450627/16 (NYSCEF No. 30) [hereinafter Lee Affidavit] (quoting
franchisee Michael Lee swearing in an April 6, 2015 affidavit that "Domino's may place me in default
of the franchise agreement and/or terminate the franchise agreement at its discretion if I do not cure the
violations to Domino's satisfaction"); Exhibit 51 to Affirmation of Terry Gernstein at 3, Domino 's, No.
450627/16 (NYSCEF No. 59) [hereinafter Sharma Affidavit] (quoting franchisee Yash Sharma
swearing in a February 27, 2014 affidavit that "[t]he agreement is non-negotiable and provides that if I
do not follow Domino's required policies the agreement may be terminated at Domino's discretion");
Exhibit 23 to Affirmation of Terry Gernstein at 3, Domino's, No. 450627/16 (NYSCEF No. 31)
[hereinafter Gaisser Affidavit] (providing franchisee Mark Gaisser's April 10, 2015 affidavit); Exhibit
21 to Affirmation of Terry Gernstein at 4-5, Domino's, No. 450627/16 (NYSCEF No. 29) [hereinafter
Cookston Affidavit] (quoting franchisee Robert Cookston in an April 7, 2015 affidavit stating franchisor
had all of the discretion).
138. See Transcript of Record at 5453, 10722, 12603, McDonald's USA, LLC, 368 N.L.R.B. No.
134 (Dec. 12, 2019) (No. 02-CA-093893) (on file with authors).
139. There are many points in the record supporting the view that McDonald's alone decided the
prospects of franchisees' future growth within the system. See id. at 1260, 5142-43, 5447, 7014-15,
7386, 12560, 20603, 21037, 21115-16, 21146. McDonald's, in its discretion, can decide which of the
eligible franchisees can expand their operations. See id. at 20369 ("Amongst those operators who are
eligible, McDonald's makes the determination which amongst those eligible operators, will be permitted
to purchase the additional restaurants[.]").
140.

See, e.g., Michael Iadevaia, Poach-No-More: Antitrust Considerationsof Intra-franchise

No-Poach Agreements, 35 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 151, 153-55 (2020) (discussing thorny issues that
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restrictions on the franchisees' ability to engage in business ventures outside of
the brand.
Franchisors broadly restrict franchisees from engaging in business
arrangements that are in competition with the franchisors' business. Through the
contract, franchisors limit franchisees from engaging in a competitive business
during the term of the contract and sometimes for a specified period after the
contract ends. For example, pizza franchisors might restrict franchisees from
opening a separate pizza business for a period of time. As Table 2 illustrates,

these provisions (often referred to as "noncompetes" or "covenants not to
compete") only restrict the independent activities of franchisees, not franchisors.
We did not uncover any contractual restrictions on the franchisors' business
opportunities. In other words, no contract limited the franchisor's right to
compete with the franchisee beyond the restrictions on allowing another store to
open within a specified geographical area around the franchisee. Sixteen out of
forty-four contracts restrict franchisees' competitive behavior during the
contract, and thirty-eight restrict it after the contract. These provisions
sometimes make room for exceptions, but only if the franchisor allows them.
Table 2: Restrictions on Competitive Behavior*
Number of
Type of Provision

Restrictions on Franchisor Competitive Behavior

Contacts
with
Provision
0141

Restrictions on Franchisee Competitive Behavior during
Contract Term

16

Restrictions on Franchisee Competitive Behavior after
Contract
Term

38

* Total number of contracts reviewed=44

Dairy Queen's contractual language is an exemplar of the nature of
noncompete provisions that apply during the term of the contract. It restricts

franchisees from engaging in "any competitive business" during the term of the
franchising no-poach agreements raise for antitrust law and proposing reform); Griffith, supra note 42,
at 191-93 (discussing anti-poach contractual provisions and the controversy surrounding them); Rachel
Abrams, 8 Fast-Food Chains Will End 'No-Poach' Policies, N.Y. TIMEs (Aug. 20, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/20/business/fast-food-wages-no-poach-franchisees.html

[https://perma.cc/48K4-7NR2].
141. Arby's as franchisor does not limit its ability to compete but does limit its ability to poach
employees somewhat. See Arby's Franchisor, LLC, License Agreement (Franchise Disclosure
Document,
Exhibit
D)
§ 13.1,
at
15
(Mar.
31,
2016),
https://www.franchimp.com/?page-pdf&f=106854_2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6R22-WHNM]
("Arby's covenants that, during the term of this License Agreement, neither Arby's nor any affiliates
controlled by Arby's will solicit or attempt to solicit any officer, employee or independent contractor of
Licensee or its affiliates to terminate or reduce his or her employment or business relationship with
Licensee or its affiliates and shall not assist any other person or entity in such a solicitation.").
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contract unless it has the franchisor's "written consent."1 42 These provisions are
often worded quite broadly in that they restrict franchisees not only from
ownership interests in competitive firms but also from working in a competitive
business as an employee.1 43 Some contracts go even further in favoring
franchisors, explicitly stating that the franchisor can compete with the franchisee
if it so chooses during the term of the contract. Baskin-Robbins's contract, for
example, states that the franchisor can conduct business, or license to other
businesses, "in ways that compete" with the franchisee's location "and that draw
customers from the same area as [the franchisee's] Restaurant."1 44 All but six of
the forty-four contracts contain a restriction on competitive behavior after
contract termination. These provisions apply for a range of one to three years1 45
and to activity within a three- to twenty-five-mile radius, depending on the
brand.1 46

While broadly worded noncompete clauses are sometimes unenforceable
because of antitrust law and other restrictions,147 they unambiguously send
franchisees a message of franchisor power over their economic behavior.
Testimony from Domino's franchisees in the NYAG case overwhelmingly
confirms this view. Even though the Domino's franchise contract formally
restricts franchisees from engaging in "carry-out or delivery pizza store
business,"148 franchisees often described their understanding of this restriction
in much broader terms, reaching beyond the pizza business.1 49 Several Domino's
142. Am. Dairy Queen Corp., supra note 131, § 10.5, at 23.
143. See, e.g.,id § 14.6, at 34.
144. Baskin-Robbins Franchising LLC, Franchise Agreement (Franchise Disclosure Document,
Exhibit
B-1)
§ 2.4(a),
at
2-3
(Mar.
30,
2016),
https://www.franchimp.com/?page-pdf&f=108153_2016.pdf [https://penna.cc/QBF4-RLDH].
145. See, e.g., Culver Franchising Sys., Inc., supra note 131, § 20(B), at B-24 to -25 (restricting
competition for one year); Bojangles' Int'l, LLC, Franchise Agreement (Franchise Disclosure
Document,
Exhibit
B)
§ XVI(A)(2)(b),
at
30-31
(Mar.
14,
2016),
https://www.franchimp.com/?page-pdf&f=106881_2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SY93-Q8HJ]
(restricting competition for three years).
146. See, e.g., Five Guys Enters., LLC, Franchise Agreement (Franchise Disclosure Document,
Exhibit
C)
§ X(C)(2)(c),
at
24
(Apr.
29,
2016),
https://www.franchimp.com/?page-pdf&f=107040_2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C99J-3TQM]
(restricting to a twenty-five-mile radius); Jimmy John's Franchise, LLC, supra note 131,§ 15(D)(3)(b),
at 59 (restricting to a three-mile radius).
147. See Michael Lindsay & Katherine Santon, No PoachingAllowed: AntitrustIssues in Labor
Markets, ANTITRUST MAG., Summer 2012, at 73, 73 ("State law regulates the enforceability of postemployment restrictive covenants, and some states (notably California) severely limit the enforceability
of non-compete and non-solicitation agreements."); see also Butler v. Jimmy John's Franchise, LLC,
331 F. Supp. 3d 786, 797 (S.D. Ill. 2018) (finding a "plausible claim" under the Sherman Act that a
franchising arrangement violated antitrust law). Franchisor bad faith behavior may also be actionable
under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Robert W. Emerson, FranchiseContract
Clauses and the Franchisor'sDuty of Care Toward Its Franchisees, 72 N.C. L. REv. 905, 929-30

(1994).
148. Domino's Pizza Franchising LLC, supra note 131, § 20.1, at 32-33; see also Exhibit 18 to
Affirmation of Terry Gernstein at 32-33, James v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., No. 450627/16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 24, 2016), NYSCEF No. 26 (same document).
149. See, e.g., Sharma Affidavit, supra note 137, at 3 ("The agreement prohibits me from having
any other business interestother than realestate investments." (emphasis added)).
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franchisees described the noncompete provision as prohibiting them "from
owning any outside business other than Domino's stores."1 50 Others described it
as only allowing franchisees to engage in "real estate investments" but nothing
beyond that.151 One franchisee aptly described the franchisor's power over his
other economic opportunities this way:

[the noncompete restriction] has the effect of essentially forcing [a
franchisee] to have all your eggs in one basket. Like you asked what
other businesses I have, I have nothing, because that is all I have. I could
own real estate, I suppose, but I have nothing, because I can't have
anything else.1 5 2

Another Domino's franchisee described the franchisor's power over his
economic opportunities like this:
The franchise agreement . .. provides that if I do not follow Domino's
required policies, Domino's may place me in default of the franchise
agreement and/or terminate the franchise agreement at its discretion if I
do not cure the violations to Domino's satisfaction. It also prohibits me
from owning any outside business other than Domino's stores.1 53
Franchisees' misunderstandings of their franchise agreements illustrate how
power translates into control. A franchisor that requires franchisees to submit to
competition restrictions and the possibility of franchisor encroachment
demonstrates the franchisor's power to destroy the franchisee's current business
and potential future business ventures, whether or not those terms are actually
enforceable. Smaller, less business-savvy franchisees are unlikely to be aware of
legal defenses to these terms. Due to limitations on future economic
opportunities and the franchisor's essentially unilateral right to terminate or not
renew the franchise agreement, the franchisee is likely to instead comply with
the franchisor's wishes in order to remain in its good graces. Effectively,
franchisors' power alters franchisee perceptions of restrictions in ways that
amplify franchisor control.
In sum, termination, renewal, and noncompete restrictions give enormous

power to the franchisor. These provisions, coupled with franchisees' sunk costs
in the initial investment and ongoing renovations, give the franchisor power over
the franchisees' economic prospects. And franchisees' misinterpretation of the
contract is another way power drives control. This power is an element of the
ongoing relationship between the parties that should form part of the

150. Lee Affidavit, supra note 137, at 2; Gaisser Affidavit, supra note 137, at 3; see also
Cookston Affidavit, supra note 137, at 4-5 ("The franchise agreement also prohibits me from owning
an outside business other than Domino's .... ").
151. Sharma Affidavit, supra note 137, at 3; see also Denman Testimony, supra note 137, at 65
(indicating the franchise agreement permitted him to invest in only real estate or stocks and bonds).
152. Exhibit 7 to Reply Affirmation of Lawrence J. Reina at 116, James v. Domino's Pizza, Inc.,
No. 450627/16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 1, 2017), NYSCEF No. 284 (excerpts from March 30, 2013
testimony of franchisee John Cilmi).
153. Gaisser Affidavit, supra note 137, at 3.
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consideration of whether the franchisor is determining (or codetermining) wages
and working conditions in the franchisee's business.
Now that we have illustrated franchisors' power over their franchisees'
economic prospects, we home in on how that power translates into control over
working conditions in practice.
B.

Recommendations as Requirements

With power over franchisees assured through the franchise contract,
franchisors control actual workplace conditions through requirements that
masquerade as recommendations. We have established with our contractual
analysis that franchisors have reserved control, which means they could control
working conditions in their franchised stores if they so desired. While the
contractual control is on reserve, it is exercisable at any time. Franchisors'
reserved control sets the stage for franchisees to interpret franchisor instructions,
which are formally billed as recommendations, as de facto requirements in
practice. This dynamic constitutes a key form of indirect exercised control over
franchisees.
Franchisors have overwhelming power in the relationship and can exert this
power to control their franchised stores. Given the inferior position of
franchisees,

54

they are strongly incentivized to follow a franchisor's policies,

even those related to working conditions, as if they were requirements.
Under the current restrictive joint employment jurisprudence, a franchisor's

recommendations about employee pay practices, grooming, and schedules for
employees are insufficient evidence of employment control on their own."
However, these so-called "recommendations" would be strong evidence of
control if considered alongside a franchisor's reserved power over a franchisee
and how that power affects the franchisee's behavior in practice. These

154. Emerson & Benoliel, supra note 16, at 205-06 ("It is worth noting that
new franchisees regularly lack prior business experience not only because of the nature of
the franchise business format, but also due to the fact that franchisors tend to prefer to contract with
franchisees with no prior business experience. Inexperienced franchisees, as opposed to those with
experience, are relatively easy to control."); id. at 207 (referring to a study that showed that "only 20
percent of the sample had actually been business owners before becoming franchisees" (quoting
Kimberley A. Morrison, An EmpiricalTest ofa Model ofFranchiseeJob Satisfaction, 34 J. SMALL Bus.
MGMT. 27, 30 (1996))); id. ("Another empirical study conducted by Alden Peterson and Rajiv Dant
shows even more strongly that most new franchisees lack prior business ownership experience ....
According to the study, only 6.7% of the sample had owned an independent business prior to joining the
franchise system." (citing Alden Peterson & Rajiv P. Dant, Perceived Advantages of the Franchise
Optionfrom the FranchiseePerspective:EmpiricalInsightsfrom a Service Franchisee,28 SMALL Bus.
MGMT. 46, 50 tbl. 1 (1990))); Paul Steinberg & Gerald Lescatre, Beguiling Heresy: Regulating the
FranchiseRelationship, 109 PENN ST. L. REv. 105, 108 (2004) ("Some franchisees are large corporate
entities, but many franchises are purchased by individuals with a limited business background.
Franchisors speak of the sophistication of two parties to a commercialbusiness contract, but the
evidence belies this, as does the franchisors own marketing strategy.").
155. See discussion supra Part I.A.
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recommendations are communicated via franchisor-provided manuals and
trainings, as well as monitoring and evaluations.
1.

Manuals and Training

Key mechanisms of franchisor influence over frontline working conditions
include franchisor-provided manuals and training. Franchisors typically require
franchisees to comply with the requirements set forth in operations manuals as
an express term of the franchise agreement. The main purpose of these operations
manuals is to ensure that food preparation and "brand standards" are uniformly
implemented in franchised restaurants. 156 Some manuals and trainings, however,
also contain instructions that relate to working conditions. 157 They often cover
aspects of working conditions such as staffing, scheduling, training, appearance,
worker safety, speed of work, and the manner of carrying out the work. I58
Although the instructions relating to employees are "recommended," they are
highly detailed and cover almost every aspect of the day-to-day activities of
frontline workers, leaving little discretion to the franchisee. 159
Both the content and nature of franchisors' manuals and trainings should
be central to joint employer inquiries, even if they are formally termed
"recommendations." Here, we provide just a few examples that suggest that

manuals and trainings go beyond food preparation and enter into employees'
working conditions. McDonald's provides instructions for how supervisors can
improve employee efficiency.1 60 Its "[U]nder the [A]rches" program helps
employees with their "speaking skills [and] English skills."161 Domino's trains
franchisees on how to staff their stores to reach the "ideal" level for labor
costs. 162 The Domino's trainings and guide inform franchisees about how to use
156. See, e.g., Susan A. Grueneberg, Joshua Schneiderman & Lulu Y. Chiu, DraftingFranchise
Agreements After Patterson v. Domino's: Avoiding the Minefield of Vicarious Liability and Joint
Employment, 36 FRANCHISE L.J. 189, 197 (2016) (referring to "operations manual[s]" as synonymous
with "brand standards manual[s]").
157. Alberterv. McDonald's Corp., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1144-45 (D. Nev. 1999) (describing
agreement language that stated that the licensee was required to "adhere to the policies set forth in the
business manuals, including the personnel policies" but also stated "that licensees may choose to adopt
the policies it sets out or may set their own policies with respect to personnel").
158. See, e.g., Steak N Shake Enters., Inc., supra note 131, § 1.6(A), at 8 ("At all times during
the Term of this Agreement, Franchisee shall maintain a competent, conscientious, trained staff and
management personnel in such number to comply with Franchisor's minimum requirements and comply
with Franchisor's standards or metrics for guest satisfaction .... "); Firehouse of Am., LLC, Franchise
Agreement (Franchise Disclosure Document, Exhibit C) § 10.1, at 16-17 (Mar. 28, 2016) (on file with
authors) ("Operations Manual . . may specify uniforms and appearance to meet brand standards.").
159. See generally McDonald's, People Practices: U.S. Operations and Training Manual (Sept.
2014) (on file with authors) ("Franchisees are independent employers who make their own decisions
and policies regarding employment-related matters pertaining to their employees. Franchisees may
choose to use part, all, or none of the contents in these materials that will be helpful to them in operating
their own McDonald's restaurant(s).").
160. See, e.g., Transcript of Record, supra note 138, at 4805 (indicating that the McDonald's
manual is meant "[to] ensure that the shift is setup for success with the right people inthe right places").

161.

Id at 3634-35.

162.

Sharma Affidavit, supra note 137, at 11.
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the franchisor's "PULSE" system to determine the lowest number of staff
necessary to meet typical customer demands at a particular time of day.1 63
Courts often ignore aspects of operations manuals and trainings termed
"recommendations" with the assumption that franchisees may safely disregard
them.1 64 But many franchisees interpret these recommended practices as
requirements for them to sustain and grow their business (and recoup their sunk

costs), enforced through the monitoring and evaluation relationship they have
with their franchisors. From the franchisees' point of view, continuing and
growing a business depends on compliance with the terms in the operations
manual, regardless of whether the franchisor formally calls some of them
recommendations. Franchisees who disregard recommendations run the risk of
losing their current and future investments in the brand. One Domino's

franchisee characterized the franchisor's monitoring and evaluations as "the way
in which you learn about the rules . .. [b]ecause if you get points off for
something, you realize that's a problem" because "it's going to hurt you .... "165
2.

Monitoring and Evaluating

There is no doubt that the vast majority of franchisors have the power to
monitor the activities of frontline workers. Many franchisors provide their
franchisees with technologies (e.g., point of sale systems) that give them the
power to review the schedules, productivity, and pay of franchisees'
employees.1 66 They communicate with franchisees' managers about operations.
They inspect stores and talk to employees as part of their visits. They evaluate
all aspects of the operation to ensure franchisees are following brand standards.
The contract gives franchisors legal power to monitor. Indeed, forty-three
out of forty-four contracts surveyed in this study give franchisors the right to
comprehensively inspect the franchisees' operations. Typically, the language in
inspection provisions gives the franchisor "the right . .. to . . . inspect the

STORE . .

videotape the operations . .
interview
customers," among other monitoring
mechanisms. i67 Often the stated goals of these provisions are to ensure
franchisee compliance with the franchisor's manuals and brand standards and
the provisions of the contract. 168 Only one of these brands (Dunkin' Donuts)
personnel

observe . .

. .

.

[and]

and

interview

163. Id.
164. See discussion supra Part I.A.
165. Exhibit ito Reply Affirmation of Lawrence J. Reina at 92, James v. Domino's Pizza, Inc.,
No. 450627/16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 1, 2017), NYSCEF No. 278 (excerpts from November 25, 2013
testimony of franchisee Michael Lee).
166. See, e.g., Steak N Shake Enters., supra note 131, §§ 3.6(C), (A), at 23-24 ("Franchisee shall
purchase the Required Technology from Franchisor" including "point-of-sale systems (including but
not limited to food cost management, supply management and labor management systems) .... ").
167. Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp., Franchise Agreement (Franchise Disclosure Document,

Exhibit B-1) § 12.3, at 23 (2016) (on file with authors).
168. See, e.g., McDonald's USA, LLC, Franchise Agreement (Traditional) § 12, at 6 (Franchise
Disclosure
Document,
Exhibit
B)
(May
1,
2016),
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gives franchisees the explicit right to "reasonable notice" from the franchisor
before an inspection can occur.1 69 Twenty-two of the contracts go so far as to
explicitly state that the franchisor can inspect its franchisees' operations without
prior notice.

70

Moreover, all forty-four contracts give the franchisor broad rights to audit
the franchisees' record keeping. The term "record" is used broadly to include
[https://perna.cc/UX7H-B4L3]
https://www.franchimp.com/?page-pdf&f=107211_2016.pdf
("McDonald's shall have the right to inspect the Restaurant at all reasonable times to ensure that
Franchisee's operation thereof is in compliance with the standards and policies of the McDonald's
System."); Chick-fil-A, Inc., supra note 135, § 13.1 ("In order to protect the Marks, the public image of
and all goodwill associated with the Marks and the System as a whole, the high quality and uniform
consistency of the Products, the cleanliness and sanitation of the Businesses and other interests of Chickfil-A: (a) Chick-fil-A, or its designee, shall have the right to inspect any Site at any time during normal
Business hours, without notice to the Operator, to ensure that all aspects thereof are in compliance with
all Minimum Standards, including, without limitation, quality, cleanliness, sanitation and operation, and
that the Operator is otherwise in full compliance with the terms and conditions of this Agreement[.]");
Jamba Juice Co., Franchise Agreement (Franchise Disclosure Document, Exhibit A) § 10.2, at 29 (Apr.
22, 2016), https://www.franchimp.com/?page=pdf&f=108262_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/DB8KNSDN] ("Company's authorized representatives shall have the right to enter upon the entire Premises
of Franchisee's Store during business hours, without disrupting Franchisee's business operations, to
examine same, conferring with Franchisee's employees, inspecting and checking operations, food,
beverages, furnishings, interior and exterior decor, supplies, fixtures, and equipment, and determining
whether the business is being conducted in accordance with this Agreement, the System and the
Manuals.").
169. Dunkin' Donuts Franchising LLC, Security Agreement (Franchise Disclosure Document,
Exhibit C-2) § 4(E), at 5 (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.franchimp.com/?page=pdf&f=108223_2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3HNN-NTGU].
170. See Baskin-Robbins Franchising, LLC, supra note 144, § 7.2, at 8; Carl's Jr. Restaurants
LLC, Franchise Agreement (Franchise Disclosure Document, Exhibit F) § 9(D), at 13 (May 2016) (on
file with authors); Checkers Drive-In Restaurants, Inc., supranote 133, § 12.01, at 30; Chick-fil-A, Inc.,
supra note 135, § 13.1(a), at 8; Del Taco LLC, Franchise Agreement (Franchise Disclosure Document,
ExhibitE) § 10(h), at 14 (Mar. 14, 2016), https://www.franchimp.com/?page=pdf&f=106995_2016.pdf
[hops://perma.cc/G6XF-U89E]; Domino's Pizza Franchising LLC, supra note 131, § 17, at 25;
Firehouse of Am., LLC, supra note 158, § 13.1, at 23; Jack in the Box Inc., supra note 134, § 5(N), at
11; Jimmy John's Franchise, LLC, supra note 131, § 11(A), at 41; Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp., supra
note 167, § 12.3, at 23; Little Caesar Enters., Inc., Franchise Agreement (Franchise Disclosurer
Document,
Exhibit
A)
§ 4.6,
at
6
(Mar.
31,
2016),
https://www.franchimp.com/?page-pdf&f=107188_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/38JZ-QHQQ]; Long
John Silver's, LLC, Franchise Agreement (Franchise Disclosure Document, Exhibit C) § 5.04(b), at 14
(2016) (on file with authors); Citadel Panda Express, Inc., License Agreement (Franchise Disclosure
Document,
Exhibit
A)
§ 13.1(A),
at
22
(Apr.
21,
2016),
https://www.franchimp.com/?page-pdf&f=107628_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/8GRB-VKS2]; Panera,
LLC, Franchise Agreement (Franchise Disclosure Document, Exhibit B) § 12.01, at 22 (Mar. 25, 2016),
https://www.franchimp.com/?page=pdf&f=107274_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/EQ7U-6FCT]; Steak N
Shake Enters., Inc., supranote 131, § 5.5, at 35; Taco Bell Corp., supra note 135, § 9, at 6; Tim Hortons
USA Inc., Franchise Agreement (Franchise Disclosure Document, Exhibit E) § 5.13(c), at 43 (2016) (on
file with authors); Quality Is Our Recipe, LLC, Unit Franchise Agreement (Franchise Disclosure
Document,
Exhibit
B)
§ 6.15,
at
9
(Mar.
30,
2016),
https://www.franchimp.com/?page-pdf&f=107514_2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3JN3-ERLR];
Wingstop Restaurants Inc., Franchise Agreement for a Wingstop Restaurant (Franchise Disclosure
Document, Exhibit C) § 7(c)(18), at 12 (2016) (on file with authors); Burger King Corp., Franchise
Agreement (Corporate) (Franchise Disclosure Document, Exhibit F) § 4(K), at 8 (Apr. 2016) (on file
with authors); Deli Mgmt., Inc., Franchise Agreement (Franchise Disclosure Document, Exhibit "B"),
§ 9(k), at 12 (Apr. 1, 2016) (on file with authors); Papa Murphy's Int'l LLC, supra note 131, § 5.66.5,
at 19.
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electronic monitoring as well as reviews of paper records such as tax returns and
payroll records. The contract for the Jason's Deli brand, for example, gives the
franchisor "direct access" to all records, "licensed software and any records in
electronic form, including, but not limited to, computer hard drives ... "171 Only
seven brands promised prior notice before conducting an audit of franchisees'
records. 7 2 Ten brands go in the other direction, explicitly stating in their
contracts that the franchisor has the right to audit the franchisee without any prior
notice. 173
Notable in the joint employer liability context, two brands included
contractual language that was careful to mention that the franchisors' monitoring
rights do not extend to matters related to the franchisees' employees. Wingstop's
audit provision, for example, explicitly states that the franchisor can require the
franchisee to provide business records except for "records which Company has
no authority to control and/or remedy," such as employee records. 7 4 The joint
employer monitoring carve outs in these two contracts, however, are the
exception. Usually, the contractual language provides franchisors with broad
power to inspect all aspects of their franchisees' operations.
Franchisors, however, do not merely possess the contractual power to
monitor (a reserved, unexercised power). Our review of the McDonald's and
Domino's documentation reveals that, in practice, franchisors influence the
employment relationship through actual monitoring and evaluating (exercised
power).
a.

McDonald's

The NLRB's case against McDonald's, which was filed under the Obama
administration and settled under the Trump administration, alleged that
McDonald's as a franchisor was jointly responsible for interfering with the

171. Deli Mgmt., Inc., supra note 170, § 9(bb), at 16.
172. See Baskin-Robbins Franchising, LLC, supra note 144, § 7.2, at 8; Dunkin' Donuts
Franchising LLC, Franchise Agreement (Franchise Disclosure Document, Exhibit B-1) § 11.2, at 12
(Mar.
30,
2016)
https://www.franchimp.com/?page=pdf&f=108223_2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3HNN-NTGU]; Arby's Franchisor, LLC, supra note 141, § 9.2, at 9; Culver
Franchising Sys., Inc., supra note 131, § 14(D), at B-19; Panera, LLC, supra note 170, § 12.02, at 22;
Papa John's Int'l, Inc., Franchise Agreement Standard Restaurant (Franchise Disclosure Document,
Exhibit B) § 13(e), at 30 (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.franchimp.com/?page=pdf&f=107278_2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DBG2-J46A]; Zaxby's Franchising LLC, License Agreement, § IV(B), at 15 (Apr. 26,
2016) (on file with authors).
173. See Checkers Drive-In Restaurants, Inc., supra note 133, § 12.02, at 30-31; Firehouse of
Am., LLC, supra note 158, § 13.2, at 23; Jimmy John's Franchise, LLC, supra note 131, § 11(B), at 42;
Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp., supra note 167, § 20.7, at 37-38; Citadel Panda Express, Inc., supra
note 170, § 13.2, at 22; Papa Murphy's Int'l LLC, supranote 131, § 4.84(6), at 14-15; Qdoba Restaurant
Corp., Qdoba Mexican Grill Franchise Agreement (Franchise Disclosure Document, Exhibit F-1) § 14.4
at 21 (Mar. 15, 2017) (on file with authors); Subway Franchise Agreement, § 5.H, at 5 (2016); Tim
Hortons USA, Inc., supra note 170, § 9.09, at 60; Jack in the Box Inc., supranote 134, § 9(D), at 18.
174. Wingstop Restaurants Inc., supra note 170, § 7(c)(24), at 13; see also Jimmy John's
Franchise, LLC, supra note 131, § 11(B), at 42.
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collective rights of fast-food employees supporting Fight for Fifteen efforts. 7 5
The testimony and accompanying exhibits in the McDonald's litigation illustrate
a dizzying array of mechanisms that allows for franchisor monitoring of its
franchised stores. These include, among other things, documentary reviews of
franchisees' paper and electronic records, on-site evaluations, and ongoing
communications through phone, e-mail, and other web-based platforms. 7 6 It is
not possible to get a firm handle on the frequency of interactions, but the
testimony suggests that McDonald's engaged in some form of monitoring of

many of its franchisees at least monthly.177
While much of the monitoring focused on food
service, aspects of franchisees' operations that dealt
conditions were also part of the franchisor's ongoing
as a franchisor, is careful not to formally require

preparation and customer
with wages and working
monitoring. McDonald's,
franchisees to follow its

suggestions with respect to wages and working conditions.17 8 Nonetheless,

McDonald's provides its franchisees with a complete set of tools related to these
issues and presents them as the best way for the franchisee to reach the
franchisor's metrics of success.
The employee staffing and scheduling area is one such example.17 9
McDonald's representatives provide franchisees with a number of tools to gauge
ideal staffing levels at different times of the day.18 0 These tools and ongoing
recommendations from McDonald's representatives suggest not only how many
employees are needed for optimal efficiency but also where employees should
position themselves to complete certain tasks most efficiently.' 8' As one

175. See supra Introduction.
176. Transcript of Record, supra note 138, at 8559-60, 8937-38, 10320, 10323-25; GC Exhibit
BC-475.1, McDonald's USA, LLC, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 134 (Dec. 12, 2019) (No. 02-CA-093893) (on
file with authors).
177. See Transcript of Record, supra note 138, at 12620-23 (referring to receipt of "SOAR
reports," "roll-up report[s]," "recap e-mail[s]," and "R2D2 staffing reports" from franchisee stores on a
monthly basis).
178. See, e.g., id at 10137 (referring to the franchisor provision of an optional "guide to help [the
franchisee] understand how to effectively leverage staff and schedule and position").
179. See id at 3782 (franchisor recommendations for staffing during holidays); id. at 4984; GC
Exhibit Q-48, McDonald's, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 134 (No. 02-CA-093893) (on file with authors); GC

Exhibit Q-48. 1, McDonald's, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 134 (No. 02-CA-093893) (on file withauthors) (staffing
recommendations).
180. Transcript of Record, supra note 138, at 10847-48 (referencing the Sales Opportunity
Analysis Report tool); id at 8997, (referring to McDonald's Labor Scheduling 2.7 tool); id at 8011; GC
Exhibit BC-210, McDonald's, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 134 (No. 02-CA-093893) (on file with authors)
(referring to franchisor representative's email to franchisees in his area recommending that they adopt
the "crew staffing calculator").
181. See Transcript of Record, supra note 138, at 8832, 9765-66, GC Exhibit BC-517,
McDonald's, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 134 (No. 02-CA-093893) (on file with authors); GC Exhibit BC.0105,
McDonald's,368 N.L.R.B. No. 134 (No. 02-CA-093893) (onfile with authors) (talking about tools that
recommend where to "position" employees); Transcript of Record, supra note 138, at 2538, 2541-42;
GC Exhibit F.92, McDonald's, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 134 (No. 02-CA-093893) (on file with authors)
("French fry person stays in position according to the positioning guide."); Transcript of Record, supra
note 138, at 4402-03, 4429-30; see also id. at 10024-25 (noting a "Hundred Days of Shopping
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McDonald's representative testified to the NLRB, these staffing tools are meant
"to put the right people in the right place at the right time." 8 2 McDonald's
representatives repeatedly offered specific guidelines around employee staffing
in their interactions with franchisees.183
Notably, McDonald's representatives included employee scheduling when
they reviewed and evaluated franchisees' operations. One franchisor
representative testified during the NLRB trial, for example, that he did "a lot of
drop by visits" where he would evaluate and make suggestions about "staffing
levels."1 8 4 Franchisor representatives consistently made sure that franchisees
"had a plan" with respect to staffing that could ensure that "labor [was] the right
percentage."1 8 5 Other franchisor representatives used the more formal reporting
mechanisms "to identify staffing opportunities" for the franchisees they worked
with in their areas.' 86 These franchisor evaluation tools, some of which were
referred to as "a scorecard," considered the "crew size" and the "staffing" of
employees.187

It is not entirely clear from the documentation we reviewed whether
repeated scheduling problems alone could land a franchisee in default. Because
Readiness" document recommending to franchisees that they position their "best employees in the most
critical areas of the restaurant").
182. Transcript of Record, supra note 138, at 6303-04; see also id at 4805; GC Exhibit Q-007,
McDonald's, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 134 (No. 02-CA-093893) (on file with authors) (referring to a
scheduling checklist for managers to be completed to "ensure that the shift is set up for success with the
right people in the right places").
183. See Transcript of Record, supra note 138, at 9059; GC Exhibit BC-0280, McDonald's, 368
N.L.R.B. No. 134 (No. 02-CA-093893) (on file with authors) (referring to consultant recommendation
that the franchisee use the franchisor's "staffing tracking tool"); Transcript of Record, supra note 138,
at 4784-85; GC Exhibit-149, McDonald's, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 134 (No. 02-CA-093893) (on file with
authors) (describing franchisor's recommendation to franchisee to develop a staffing plan to ensure all
shifts are properly staffed, which, as a result, would maximize capacity and optimize the service drivers
in the restaurant); Transcript of Record, supra note 138, at 8546; GC Exhibit BC-462.1, McDonald's,
368 N.L.R.B. No. 134 (No. 02-CA-093893) (on file with authors) (describing franchisor statement to
franchisee that planning a healthy schedule in order to have effective labor controls is the goal);
Transcript of Record, supranote 138, at 8554-56; GC Exhibit BC-496, McDonald's,368 N.L.R.B. No.
134 (No. 02-CA-093893) (on file with authors) (describing franchisor instruction to franchisee to make
sure the grill is staffed properly); Transcript of Record, supra note 138, at 10137 (describing franchisor
representative sending a franchisee an optional "guide to help [the franchisee] understand how to
effectively leverage staff and schedule and position"); id at 10154; GC Exhibit BC-1458, McDonald's,
368 N.L.R.B. No. 134 (No. 02-CA-093893) (onfile withauthors) (describing franchisor representative's
work with franchisees to "identify trends and adjust staffing needs").
184. Transcript of Record, supra note 138, at 8838; GC Exhibit BC-518, McDonald's, 368
N.L.R.B. No. 134 (No. 02-CA-093893) (on file with authors); see also Transcript of Record, supra note
138, at 11199-200; GC Exhibit BC.1270, McDonald's, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 134 (No. 02-CA-093893) (on
file with authors) (recalling "mentioning during a visit" that "schedules [were] not being posted with
enough time in advance for the crew").
185. Transcript of Record, supra note 138, at 7848.
186. Id at 10551-52; see also id. at 11154 (referring to a scorecard as a tool to evaluate
scheduling); id at 8557; GC Exhibit BC-495.1, McDonald's, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 134 (No. 02-CA093893) (on file with authors) (describing franchisor representative who had a "labor schedule and
verification sheet").
187. Transcript of Record, supranote 138, at 3299-3300; GC Exhibit HR-636, McDonald's, 368
N.L.R.B. No. 134 (No. 02-CA-093893) (on file with authors) (referring to "people scorecard").
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McDonald's has sole discretion to impose a variety of adverse actions short of
termination (from nonrenewal of an existing franchise agreement to non-referral
of a new store purchase opportunity), it is difficult to discern the extent to which
franchisors sanction franchisees for refusing to implement a recommended
practice. Nonetheless, the franchisor message to franchisees is clearly that
scheduling management problems will result in "lost . . . points" on their

evaluations.1 88 In sum, the McDonald's litigation reveals how franchisor
monitoring and evaluation of franchisees' stores transform instructions labeled
recommendations into instructions that are interpreted as requirements.
b.

Domino's

Domino's, like McDonald's, influences its franchised stores through
monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. In-person visits are one such way that
Domino's communicates its recommendations regarding working conditions.
One Domino's franchisee recounted a franchisor visit when the franchisor
representative said to the employees, "I'm your boss," told them, "that he had
the power to shut the stores down completely," and reminded them that if that
happened, "they wouldn't have jobs."1 89
Evaluation processes are a key mechanism of indirect control. Domino's
franchisees described the evaluations process as a review of their compliance
with all of the standards listed in the contract and associated manuals.1 90
Following these evaluations, Domino's has threatened to issue defaults,
sometimes related to evaluations of employees' working conditions.191 Thus,
franchisees view failure to follow franchisor instructions around employee
matters as putting their investment in the franchise (as well as future economic
opportunities) at risk.

Indeed, franchisees reported their perception that the franchisor can
terminate the contract when franchisees are "not following rules about personnel
matters."11 92 One franchisee noted, for example, "that Domino's has a number of
requirements that [franchisees] are expected to follow, including employee
behavior.... And that if employees fail to meet those requirements, one

188. Transcript of Record, supra note 138, at 7264 (referring to "lost" points in the context of
scheduling).
189. Lee Affidavit, supra note 137, at 7.
190. See Sharma Affidavit, supra note 137, at 14 ("Every three to four months, Domino's has
conducted . . unannounced inspections of my Domino's franchise stores ... . with points awarded for
on time deliveries, employees with clean uniforms, and employee correct responses to role played
customer complaints. Domino's inspectors have interviewed drivers and inside workers to evaluate
whether they address customer complaints pursuant to Domino's protocol, reviewed whether employees
meet appearance standards and drivers use seat belts, and checked whether drivers are carrying more
than $20 in cash. The Domino's inspectors prepare a report that same day that evaluates the store and
notes whether I have a failing score and/or need to cure any aspect of my operation.").
191. See infra notes 195 and 198 and accompanying text.
192. Denman Testimony, supra note 137, at 132.
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consequence could be termination of the franchise."1 93 Other Domino's
franchisees commented that the franchisor influenced employees' working
conditions because it evaluated the franchisee based on the speed and efficiency
of franchisees'

employees.1

94

Similarly, a franchisee recounted that the

franchisor threatened him with a default because of issues that explicitly related
to employees' working conditions. The franchisor alleged he was in default for
such things as "failing to pay employees properly," not keeping "proper pay

records," neglecting to have enough staff available for the volume of orders, "and
failing to keep I-9 and other personnel records."1 95 Another franchisee stated that
Domino's reduced the score of one of his stores because an employee with an
ingrown hair condition "didn't have a doctor's note" to justify facial hair longer
than an inch.1 96 As another example, a franchisee mentioned that the franchisor
ordered him to remove an employee tip jar after a franchisor inspection.1 97 He
noted the high stakes of these franchisor evaluations, saying that if one of his
stores was in default, the franchisor could place "all of the stores I operate" into
default.1 98 As a result, he complied with the tip jar directive. 199 Yet another
example is a Domino's franchisee who reluctantly disciplined a longtime
employee based on the franchisor's demand. 200 He said that he did this because
the franchisor would subject him to default as a consequence of
'

noncompliance. 20

193. Exhibit 4 to Affirmation of Christopher M. Colorado at 139, James v. Domino's Pizza, Inc.,
No. 450627/16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 9, 2016), NYSCEF No. 206 (excerpts from November 25, 2013
testimony of franchisee Michael Lee).
194. Cookston Affidavit, supra note 137, at 17 ("15 of the 100 OER points are allocated to a
store's service, or the store's ability to meet Domino's delivery time requirements as reflected in the
PULSE Service Time Reports. During an inspection, the OER inspector evaluates the past twenty-eight
days of PULSE order records. Domino's requires that all orders are taken within one minute, assembled
and placed on the oven within three minutes, cooked within seven minutes, and delivered within thirty
minutes. Franchisees who meet those time requirements at least 85% of the time receive all 15 points
on this section, franchisees who only deliver 70% on time receive five of fifteen points, and franchisees
whose PULSE records show slower times might receive no points.").
195. Sharma Affidavit, supra note 137, at 14.
196. Exhibit 3 to Affirmation of Teriy Gernstein at 240, James v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., No.
450627/16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 2016), NYSCEF No. 11 (excerpts from December 10, 2013
testimony of franchisee Anthony Maestri).
197. See Lee Affidavit, supranote 137, at 10 ("I am not able to opt out of either the OER or EOC
visits, and I must make all changes that Domino's requires after each such visit, including changes I
would consider too insignificant for Domino's to notice. For example, a few years ago, Mr. DuPont
ordered me to remove the tip jar on the counter of the Pizza Wars store. He did not explain why, and I
had to comply immediately.").
198. Id, at 9-10 ("It is my understanding that when Domino's finds serious OER violations in
one of my stores, it can place not only the violating store in default, but all of the stores I operate.").
199. Id. at 10.
200. Exhibit 2 to Affirmation of Christopher M. Colorado at 226-27, James v. Domino's Pizza,
Inc., No. 450627/16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 9, 2016), NYSCEF No. 204 (excerpts from December 12, 2013
testimony of franchisee Robert Cookston).
201. Id; see also Denman Testimony, supra note 137, at 46,48 ("I felt pretty strongly about what
I had stated to you, that he has been a good employee. They felt that the brand was too much risk, and
they said you have to terminate this employee. I asked them to put it in writing. They would not. They
straight out told me they would terminate my contract if I did not terminate this employee.").
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Adding to Domino's control over workplace behavior is the significant
involvement of its field representatives in determining whether franchisees have
violated general standards, such as customer satisfaction, and whether a
franchisee has cured a default adequately. Franchisees have been placed in
default for failing to provide adequate documentation of employee disciplinary
action and training for an infraction and because field representatives have not
been satisfied with the franchisees' response to customer complaints. 20 2 In one
case, a field representative addressed a franchisee's low store scores by
pressuring the franchisee to hire a manager and then instructing the manager of
his specific job duties. 20 3
Relatedly, franchisees have interpreted recommended practices as
effectively required. While Domino's only provides "ideal" scheduling software
to franchisees as a recommendation, as one franchisee explained, Domino's both
"expects me to schedule an 'ideal' number of employees at any one time, as few
as possible to meet the customer demand" and "has told me that I have received
a notice of default for . .. failing to schedule enough personnel to handle
customer orders."

20 4

In sum, these data and findings show that franchisors have extensive
reserved power in the franchise relationship and can exert this power to control
working conditions in franchise stores. The vast array of rules and recommended
policies franchisors disseminate to franchisees has greater force than courts and
federal administrative agencies currently recognize. Given their inferior position
and franchisors' power over them, franchisees are strongly incentivized to follow
these rules and to interpret franchisors' extensive recommendations related to
working conditions as requirements. None of the above analysis is meant to
suggest that the McDonald's or Domino's cases have, in fact, satisfied a
particular joint employer standard-the NLRB settled the McDonald's case
without the franchisor, and the trial court in Domino's recently dismissed the
suit, which NYAG has appealed.205 Instead, our point is that franchisors can, as
these franchisors appear to do, use their extensive power in the franchise
agreement in ways that reach deep into the employment relationship, raising a
plausible claim of joint employer status. The evidence unearthed by these claims
is a compelling justification for deeper joint employer inquiries by courts and
administrative agencies.

202. See Exhibits 111, 112, 117 to Affirnnation of Terry Gernstein, James v. Domino's Pizza,
Inc., No. 450627/16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 2016), NYSCEF Nos. 119, 120, 125 (default notices).
203. Exhibit 78 to Affirmation of Terry Gernstein at 130-31, Domino's, No. 450627/16
(NYSCEF No. 86) (excerpts from December 17, 2013 testimony of franchisee Duane Webster).
204.
Sharma Affidavit, supra note 137, at 11, 14.
205. At writing, the trial court has dismissed the claims in Domino's and the N.Y. Attorney
General has filed a notice of appeal. Transcript of Proceedings, James v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., No.
450627/16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 27, 2020), NYSCEF No. 480; Notice of Appeal, James v. Domino's
Pizza, Inc., No. 450627/16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 5, 2021), NYSCEF No. 480.
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III.
POWER AS CONTROL IN THEORY AND DOCTRINE

Part III provides a theoretical and doctrinal grounding of our proposed
approach, which, if embraced, would disrupt the trend of foreclosing joint
employer claims in franchising. Put simply, we argue that power, and power

relations between franchisors and franchisees, should be centralto the inquiry of
whether the franchisor "controls" the working conditions of franchisees'
employees. 206 Franchisors have the capacity to change franchisee behavior
indirectly with reserved control and through field staff, who use relational
mechanisms such as manuals, trainings, monitoring, and evaluations to direct
operations.

This Section will develop our power as control theory and then illustrate
that the power as control construct is consistent with existing labor and
employment law doctrine. In other words, it can be adopted without the need for
law reform. While consideration of power relations in labor and employment law
typically homes in on the relationship between the lead company and the
frontline worker, there is some precedent for considering the power relations
between the lead company and the subordinate business entity.
A franchisor's power over its franchisees is relevant in weighing the extent
to which franchisors reserve or exercise their power to alter franchisee behavior
and treatment of their staff. Power is a key part of the equation when determining
whether the franchisor and franchisee codetermine working conditions.
A.

Theoretical Underpinningsof Power and Control

Our thesis is that assessing franchisor control in a joint employer analysis
requires accounting for franchisors' power over franchisees. Evidence of the
power as control can be found in the franchise agreement terms, in the behavior
of franchisors monitoring and enforcing franchise store compliance, and in
franchisees interpreting their responsibilities. A joint employer analysis that
disregards this power imbalance ignores the labor and employment law goal to
offset bargaining power inequalities. It ignores the importance of collective

bargaining between the workers who represent the brand to the consumer and
the company that owns the brand and shapes the workplace standards of those
workers. It disregards franchisor behavior that can suppress wages and shift
wage and hour law liability to franchisees, harming workers and defeating the
deterrence and remedial goals of wage and hour law.

206. This is consistent with Robert Dahl and others who have defined power as "the capacity of
an actor to compel another actor to do something the latter otherwise would not do." Brookes, supra
note 31, at 254 (citing and describing ROBERT DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN
AN AMERICAN CFFY (1961)); see also id. at 255 ("Conceiving of power as a capacity is also compatible
with the notion . . that power is the product of actors' relationships of interdependence, conditioned by
their embeddedness in the economic, institutional and social structures comprising their external
environment.").
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While law scholars have identified power disparities as a pervasive feature
of franchise relationships, until recently, this discussion has been confined to
contract and antitrust law. As Albert Choi and George Triantis explained,
contract law, as demonstrated by the doctrines of duress and unconscionability,
is attentive to how power accrues to the party with greater access to information
and bargaining sophistication.207 In contract law, legal controversies often erupt

when extreme imbalances in bargaining power lead the stronger party to pursue
value-claiming terms instead of value-producing ones. 208
Contract law scholar Gillian Hadfield identified power disparities in the
franchisor-franchisee relationship thirty years ago and explained how incomplete
contracts can defeat the expectations of franchisees, making them vulnerable to
franchisor opportunism. 209 From a contract law perspective, the "unavoidable
incompleteness" in franchise contracts is problematic because it threatens to
"defeat[] the relationally reinforced expectations of franchisees as to what
commitments they acquire from the franchisor in exchange for their own
commitments."210 But, while contract law recognizes the problems created by
inequalities in bargaining power,211 contract law doctrines typically approach

disparities in bargaining power through gap-filling measures that reflect the
parties' expectations.212

While considerations of power inform when and how a court in a contract
law dispute should intervene, 213 contract law typically rejects power disparities
as a basis to adjust contract terms. 21 4 Consistent with this view, Hadfield
proposed the doctrinal tool of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to
account for the different expectations and interests of franchisors and franchisees
in filling gaps in the franchise agreement. 21 5 Even though requiring good faith in
franchise relations can reduce franchisor opportunism, it may not attend to other

207. See Albert Choi & George Triantis, The Effect of BargainingPower on ContractDesign,
98 VA. L. REv. 1665, 1676-77 (2012).
208. Id. at 1671-73 ("The problem of extreme allocations of bargaining power in either direction
stems, in part, from the fact that one party has the power to dictate the terms of trade. The party with this
power is willing, in many circumstances, to sacrifice some of the aggregate surplus in order to capture
a larger share of the surplus.").
209. Hadfield, supranote 33.
210. Id. at 929-30.
211. As Omri Ben-Shahar explained, in contract law there is "a substantial doctrinal tradition . .
founded on the belief that courts can identify bargaining power and determine legal consequences based
on this identification." Omri Ben-Shahar, A BargainingPower Theory of DefaultRules, 109 COLUM.
L. REV. 396, 409 (2009).
212. Id. at 408.
213. Omri Ben-Shahar, Fixing Unfair Contracts, 63 STAN. L. REV. 869, 901-04 (2011).
214. Id. at 897-98 (arguing that contract law interventions to equalize terms in a contract beyond
minimal repairs to a tolerable level because of a party's greater bargaining power are "unhelpful,"
because the power disparity will "continue to manifest itself elsewhere in the contract").
215. Hadfield, supra note 33, at 985-86. A good-faith analysis, according to Hadfield, permits
courts to ask, when identifying divergent interests in a franchise relationship, whether the franchisor's
control power has enabled the franchisor "to pursue its interest at the expense of the franchisee's." Id. at
989.
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important values, such as fairness, 216 and can leave third parties in the economic
relationship unprotected. In the case of franchising, contract law does not resolve
the problem of franchisor opportunism that can harm franchise store
employees. 2 17

Power disparities in franchise relationships have also been the subject of
recent antitrust litigation and scholarship. While antitrust law applies equally to
product and labor markets, 218 it has historically neglected the problem of
anticompetitive behavior that harms workers. 219 Monopsony power, or the
employer's buyer market power over employees, 220 has received greater antitrust

attention recently. Studies by economists have shown how franchisors can
suppress

wages

through

restraints

like

non-compete

and

no-poaching

requirements in franchise agreements. 221 Actions by state attorneys general and
private antitrust lawsuits over the past several years have challenged franchisor
no-poaching agreements with some success. 222

The antitrust law focus on buyer market power shares with our power
analysis a concern that franchisors can exert their power in ways that suppress
work standards. Antitrust doctrine, however, imposes considerable impediments
to litigating power disparities in the franchise relationship that can harm
workers. 223 This is because of the intellectual shift ushered in by the Chicago
216. Id at 953.
217. Elmore, supra note 5, at 944-46.
218.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act broadly declares illegal "[e]very contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations," 15 U.S.C. § 1, and does not distinguish between product and labor markets.
219. Ioana Marinescu & Eric A. Posner, Why Has AntitrustLaw FailedWorkers?, 105 CORNELL
L. REV. 1343, 1346-47 (2020).
220. As Ioana Marinescu and Eric Posner explained, "[a] labor monopsony exists when lack of
competition in the labor market enables employers to suppress the wages of their workers." Id at 134546.
221. Krueger & Ashenfelter, supra note 126, at 2-4. Brian Callaci conducted an empirical study
of vertical restraints in 530 franchise agreements, finding that, for example, virtually all of them required
franchisees to sign covenants not to compete with the franchisor after the franchise relationship ends,
and that sixty-nine percent of fast-food franchisors required no-poaching agreements. He argued that
these and other vertical restraints allow "franchisors to impose a high-effort, low-wage labor
management regime" on franchisees. Callaci, supra note 123, at 398, 408, 413.
222. See Marinescu & Posner, supra note 219, at 1369; see also, e.g., Deslandes v. McDonald's
USA, LLC, No. 17 C 4857, 2018 WL 3105955, at *6-8 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018) (finding that allegations
of horizontal elements in a franchisor's no-poaching agreement state a claim for a restraint that may
violate antitrust law).
223. See Orly Lobel, Boilerplate Collusion: Clause Aggregation, Antitrust Law & Contract
Governance,
106 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 30-47),
https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3810250
[https://perma.cc/3LDQ-NYTQ]
(explaining doctrinal impediments to antitrust challenges of employment restraints, such as noncompete
agreements, including the difficulty of discerning antitrust violations in individual contracts, and
enforcement of class waivers that preclude aggregation of claims). While some restraints are
unreasonable per se and presumptively unlawful under antitrust law, antitrust law generally applies a
deferential "rule of reason" standard for most vertical restraints imposed by lead firms on subordinate
firms in a distribution chain. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2277, 2283-84 (2018); see
also Cont'l TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54 (1977) (holding that nonprice vertical
restraints are subject to the rule of reason); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997) (finding that
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School, beginning in the 1960s, insisting that antitrust law should primarily be
guided by efficiency. 224 For the Chicago School, vertical restraints can benefit
consumers by promoting interbrand competition. 225 By 1977, the Supreme Court
in Continental Television v. GTE Sylvania adopted this view, finding that vertical

restraints "promote interbrand competition by allowing the manufacturer to
achieve certain efficiencies," in distribution.226 To be sure, continued antitrust
enforcement of no-poaching agreements as illegal restraints is likely to deter
those agreements given their horizontal elements and wage suppression effect. 227
But, lacking horizontal elements and clear anticompetitive effects, most
franchisor control over franchisees is permissible. 228
The Chicago School efficiency framework has come under increasing
criticism for failing to attend to the harmful effects of monopsony power 229 while
simultaneously forbidding coordination among workers who are independent
maximum price restraints are subject to the rule of reason); Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v.
PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007) (holding that rule of reason also applies to maximum price
restraints). The rule of reason typically requires courts to engage in a fact-specific assessment of market
power and structure to assess the restraint'sactual effect on competition and requires the plaintiffs to
show that the restraint is in fact unreasonable and anticompetitive. See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at
2284.
224.
See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 20-21
(1978); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 19-20 (1976); Frank H.

Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule ofReason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 138-40 (1984).
For a critical view of the Chicago School intervention into antitrust law, see TIM Wu, THE CURSE OF
BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 86-92 (2018).

225. POSNER, supra note 224, at 147-51; Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits ofAntitrust, 63 TEX.
L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1984).
226. 433 U.S. at 54.
227.
Some courts have found that allegations of no-poaching agreements between franchisors
and franchisees are sufficient to state an antitrust claim because of their horizontal elements. See Blanton
v. Domino's Pizza Franchising LLC, No. 18-13207, 2019 WL 2247731, at *4 (E.D. Mich. May 24,
2019); Deslandes, 2018 WL 3105955, at *6-8.
228. See, e.g., Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of Am., Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1226 (3d Cir. 1976)
(rejecting class certification of tying claim because there was not sufficient proof that each plaintiff was
coerced into accepting arrangement); Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1055,
1062 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 124 F.3d 430 (3d Cir. 1997) (rejecting post-contract market definition
because "allegations of wrongdoing in the post-contractual setting implicate principles of contract, and
are not the concern of the antitrust laws"); Martino v. McDonald's Sys., Inc., 625 F. Supp. 356, 363
(N.D. Ill. 1985) ("Designating menu selections and specifications, without more, does not implicate the
antitrust laws."). Some courts considering antitrust claims have also found that franchisors and their
franchisees cannot conspire under antitrust law because they are single enterprises. See Arrington v.
Burger King Worldwide, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 3d, 1322, 1332 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (dismissing action because
franchisor no-poaching agreement with franchisee qualified as single firm exception to Sherman Act
Section 1 conspiracy claim); see also Sanjukta Paul, Antitrust as Allocator of Coordination Rights, 67
UCLA L. REV. 378, 408-09 (2020) (discussing court extension of antitrust firm exemption to the
franchise relationship).
229. WU, supra note 224, at 91 (criticizing the Chicago School intervention as "laissez-faire
reincarnated, without the Social Darwinist baggage, and with a slightly less overt worship of
monopoly-but with much the same result"); Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and
Inequality: The Antitrust Counterrevolution and Its Discontents, 11 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 235, 238-

245 (2017). This echoes longstanding critiques of the Chicago School intervention in antitrust law for
subordinating other values, such as fairness and deconcentration of markets. See generally Eleanor M.
Fox, The Battle for the Soul ofAntitrust, 75 CAuF. L. REV. 917 (1987).
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contractors to oppose monopsony power. 230 Others have proposed increased
scrutiny of franchisor-imposed restraints. 23 1 While our analysis of the power

imbalance in the franchise relationship is aligned with these critiques and
proposals, the doctrinal limitations in antitrust law will remain a significant
impediment in addressing franchisor opportunism that can harm workers.
Instead, the statutory purposes of the NLRA and FLSA guide our project to

uncover power as a form of control in labor and employment law. These laws
address power disparities in economic relationships by safeguarding the rights
of employees to collectively improve terms and conditions of employment and
by mandating minimum workplace standards. Our theory of power as control
builds upon the work of scholars who have similarly argued that labor and
employment law doctrines must account for power disparities in the employment
relationship. Our approach is consistent with Hiba Hafiz's work on the NLRA,
which called for deeper consideration of inequality of bargaining power through
social scientific inquiry.232 Failure to "ensur[e] equal bargaining power between

labor and capital," according to Hafiz, has "significantly eroded workers'
ability . .
[to] strike," contrary to the NLRA's purpose. 233 To advance the
NLRA's goal of promoting collective action to equalize the bargaining power

between employers and employees, she called for a "structural approach" that
"takes into account workers' relative bargaining power as compared to their
employers in determining the scope of substantive labor rights and in resolving
disputes." 234 While Hafiz's proposed approach primarily focused on economic
analysis in labor law, especially the effect of labor market restraints such as nopoaching agreements, it supports our power as control thesis in that it calls for
an explicit consideration of power as part of labor law analysis. 235
In a similar vein, Noah Zatz criticized a control test focus on direct control
for ignoring how more powerful parties can shift costs and risks to others in an
employment relationship. 236 Zatz advanced that imbalances of power between
230.
Sanjukta M. Paul, Uber as For-Profit Hiring Hall: A Price-Fixing Paradox and Its
Implications, 38 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 233, 261 (2017) (critiquing antitrust law for permitting
"the owners of a firm to benefit from a price premium from coordination when the providers of the
service sold are barred from doing so").
231. Marinescu and Posner suggested that courts hold broad no-poaching agreements per se
unlawful and relax the Sherman Act Section 1 labor market definition requirement to ease class
certification. Marinescu & Posner, supra note 219, at 1387-88. They also proposed congressional action
to prohibit employers from requiring employees to waive class-action participation in arbitration
provisions in employment contracts. Id. at 1393-94.
232. Hafiz, supra note 13, at 661-62.
233. Id. at 682.
234. Id. at 661-62. This would empower the NLRB to consider in a joint employer analysis
"labor-market restraints that limit workers' bargaining power, including use of no-poaching and noncompete provisions in franchising contracts." Id. at 717.
235. Hafiz shared our concern with the NLRB's failure to account for the franchisor's unequal
bargaining power "over its franchisees' employees" as a metric for showing the franchisor's control. Id.
at 657-58.
236. Noah D. Zatz, Beyond Misclassification: Tackling the Independent ContractorProblem
Without Redefining Employment, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 279, 294 (2011).
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the company and those that labor on its behalf not only distort working
conditions but also "equally well can distort the [company's] very choice
between employment and other work arrangements."

237

In other words, limiting

joint employer consideration to specific types of direct control enables
companies to wield their power to reconfigure business operations such that they
are insulated from employment responsibilities. Zatz situated his argument in the
context of independent contractor arrangements and whether the NLRB should
consider the extent to which anti-union animus motivates the classification of a
worker as an independent contractor instead of an employee. 238 But his argument
is broadly applicable to other workplace laws and to franchising.
Without considering the power to control workplaces, the exclusive judicial
focus on the formal trappings of control indirectly invites an endless
reconfiguring of the contractual relationship by the more powerful companies to
avoid liability. Again, while Zatz spoke of a different context, a fairness principle
guides his argument that the power to shift costs and risks is equivalent to direct
control. Fairness requires accounting for franchisor power when evaluating
control over wages and working conditions. A franchisor with superior
bargaining power because of monopsony power, information asymmetries,

sophistication, and expertise can engage in opportunistic behavior that drives
down workplace standards notwithstanding the absence of the trappings of direct
control. As Zatz argued, considerations of power and the ability of parties with
superior power to indirectly control workplace conditions are essential.
B.

Doctrinal Underpinningsof Power and Control in Labor and
Employment Law

Even though economic power alone does not necessarily translate into
franchisor control over franchisees and their employees, some labor and
employment law cases do provide justification for considering the inequality of
bargaining power between contracting parties. 239 Here, we will show doctrinal

support for our claim that a franchisor's power over its franchisees is relevant in
weighing the extent to which franchisors reserve or exercise this power to alter
franchisee behavior in NLRA and FLSA claims. Despite the decisional law
outlined in Part I, which found no joint employer relationship in franchising,
there is significant doctrinal support for considering power in the joint employer
doctrine.
Case law on lead entities and subsidiary actors has acknowledged the role
of power in joint employer determinations, sometimes implying that a lead
237. Id
238. Zatz's specific argument was that an anti-union motive to adopt an independent contractor
model should raise similar concerns as "a decision to subcontract work in order to avoid unionization,"
which is recognized as an unfair labor practice under Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. Id. at
291; 29 U.S.C. § 158.
239. See, e.g., Lopez v. Silverman, 14 F. Supp. 2d 405, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (acknowledging
relevance of "[lead company] Renaissance's power and influence over [subordinate company] Woo").
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company's power can lead to "functional control" for employment purposes. 240
The Fifth Circuit, in Castillo v. Givens, considered the power relations between

a grower and his farm labor contractor in the joint employment context. The
court concluded that, even though the contractor "did exercise some control over
the field workers, there was 'no economic substance' behind his power."

24

1 It

was the grower who had the power, and thus control, over the working conditions
of the field workers. 242 The contractor only invested a "hoe" and the grower
provided "all investment or risk capital" in the land, supplies, and equipment.243
In Carrillo v. Schneider Logistics Trans-Loading & Distribution, Inc., a case

involving Walmart and a subcontractor, a California district court acknowledged
the lead company's power over its subcontractor, reasoning that the
subcontractor understood recommendations as nondiscretionary. 244 In other
words, upon considering the realities of power relations, the court concluded that
the recommendations could be understood as requirements or directives. 245
In Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., the Second Circuit acknowledged the

importance of power relations between a garment manufacturer and its garment
assembly contractors by articulating joint employer factors that could decipher
who was calling the shots with respect to frontline assembly workers. 246 Along

240. See, e.g., Chen v. St. Beat Sportswear, Inc., 364 F. Supp. 2d 269, 279 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(acknowledging that a lead company can have "functional control over workers even in the absence of
[ formal control" (quoting Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 72 (2d Cir. 2003))).
241.
Castillo v. Givens, 704 F.2d 181, 192 (5th Cir. 1983), disapprovedof on other groundsby
McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128 (1988). Agricultural workers who perform work on a
single farm for a growing season are generally able to raise at least a genuine issue of fact about the joint
employer status of growers. See Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 633, 641 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining
that both regulatory and non-regulatory factors can be considered by courts in determining whether a
worker is employed by more than one entity at the same time); Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., Inc.,
603 F.2d 748, 755 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that economic realities, not contractual labels, determine
employment status); see also Griffith, supra note 42 at 200-03 (discussing case law finding joint
employment in the agricultural context); Annie Smith & Patricia Kakalec, Joint Employment in the
AgriculturalSector, in WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE AND WHO IS THE EMPLOYER?: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 68TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR, supra note 90,

at 379,

379 (noting

the prominence of joint employment concepts in agriculture).
242. Castillo, 704 F.2d at 192.
243. Id
244. No. 11-cv-8557, 2014 WL 183956, at *16 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2014).
245.
Scholars have challenged courts that ignore indirect control in other contexts as well. See,
e.g., Lung, supra note 33, at 321 (describing a court that, in a farmworker case, "conjoined masterservant law and contract law to reproduce formalistic definitions of employer and employee"). Lung
wrote that the court's "insistence on strict control and supervision comported with the master-servant
model, in which the master wielded direct and tangible physical domination over the performance of
workers who were part of his household. However, this formalism fail[ed] to account for the complex
ways inwhich work in a modem economy has been reconfigured by subcontracting practices [and when]
a work arrangement is based on multiple layers of relationships that are designed to attenuate the
employment relationship." Id.
246.
355 F.3d 61, 74 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing joint employer claim involving contractor that
services a single putative joint employer, stating that "it is difficult not to draw the inference that a
subterfuge arrangement exists"). Manufacturers are often considered joint employers of employees of
garment contractors that primarily fill orders for one or a few manufacturers. See, e.g., id at 75-76;
Lopez v. Silverman, 14 F. Supp. 2d 405, 422-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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similar lines, the Ninth Circuit recently concluded that a labor contractor and the
fruit growers who contracted with them were joint employers of Thai workers
who came to the United States as part of the H-2A guest worker program. 24 7

Even though the contractor (Global Horizons) directly controlled employment
conditions, the court found that the fruit growers were joint employers because
they "possessed ultimate authority over [employment conditions] ."248 As the
court stated,
If the Growers were dissatisfied with the quality of Global Horizons'
services, they could have demanded changes, withheld payment, or
ended the contract with Global Horizons altogether. The power to
control the manner in which housing, meals, transportation, and wages
were provided to the Thai workers, even if never exercised, is sufficient
to render the Growers joint employers .... 249
Thus, the court found the power imbalance between the growers and the
contractor central to its finding that reserved control was sufficient to establish a
joint employment relationship.

The consideration of inequality of power between the franchisor and
franchisee is not unlike the consideration of inequality of bargaining power
between the employer and employee. In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., a seminal

labor law case, the Court concluded that the NLRB should account for power
imbalances when considering whether an employer's statements about job loss
before a union election were an implicit threat of retaliation .250 In other words,
rather than considering how an objective person would interpret seemingly
benign predictions about the effects of unionization, the Court concluded that the
NLRB should consider how an economically dependent individual would
interpret the statements.251 They might be more prone to "pick up intended

implications" of the employer's statement that might "be more readily dismissed
by a more disinterested ear." 25 2 Translating this to the franchising context,
franchisees are more likely than arms-length, independent businesses to perceive
and respond to franchisor "recommendations" as requirements in light of the
franchisors' immense power over the economic opportunities of franchisees.
This is because a subcontractor dependent on a contractor's business might hear
the contractor's suggestions to improve productivity as "an expectation that [the

247. U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'nv. Glob. Horizons, Inc., 915 F.3d 631,634 (9th Cir.
2019).
248. Id at 641.
249. Id
250. 395 U.S. 575, 579 (1969).
251. Id at 617-18.
252. Id at 617. Hafiz also pointed to NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822 (1984), in
which the Supreme Court reasoned that Section 7 of the NLRA, which protects collective action among
employees, is intended to equalize power between employers and employees, including in workplaces
subject to a collective bargaining agreement, as an example of the Supreme Court considering unequal
bargaining power in labor law. See Hafiz, supranote 13, at 681.
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subcontractor] would follow these suggestions." 25 3 Translating this to power
imbalances between franchisors and franchisees, decision-makers should
consider how economic dependence affects whether franchisees interpret
franchisors' "recommendations" as requirements.
Courts that have moved toward a joint employer inquiry that analyzes
whether parties co-determine workers' terms and conditions of employment are
also in line with our power as control approach. A Fourth Circuit case, Salinas
v. CommercialInteriors, Inc. 254 is probably the most emblematic of this trend.
In Salinas, the Fourth Circuit criticized joint employer tests that focus on "the
relationship between a putative joint employer and a worker, rather than the
relationship between putativejoint employers." 255 It directed courts to consider,

in particular, whether the
conditions of a worker's
"formally or informally,
power over its franchisee

lead company "codetermines the essential terms and
employment" along with the subordinate company
directly or indirectly." 256 Assessing a franchisor's
through the contract and methods of monitoring and

enforcing the contract in practice is essential in evaluating codetermination. 25 7

Courts deciding a wide spectrum of labor and employment law issues often
consider whether the lead entity has the right to, 258 or the power to, control
working conditions. 25 9 Our approach is consistent with this view. We argue that
franchisors' economic power over franchisees, in combination with their
expansive recommendations relating to working conditions, is the franchisor's
recipe for indirect control over fast-food workers in their franchised stores.
Accounting for this method of indirect control will be necessary to end the
widespread foreclosure of joint employer claims in franchising.
IV.
IMPLEMENTING THE POWER AS CONTROL APPROACH

Foreclosing joint employer liability for fast-food franchisors
underestimates franchisor power and the extent to which a typical franchisor
exerts unexercised and exercised control over franchisees and their low-wage
253. Carrillo v. Schneider Logistics Trans-Loading & Distrib., Inc., No. 11-cv-8557, 2014 WL
183956, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2014).
254. 848 F.3d 125 (4th Cir. 2017).
255. Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
256. Id. at 141-42.
257. See id.
258. See, e.g., Bogosian v. All Am. Concessions, No. 06-CV-1633, 2008 WL 4534036, at *11
(E.D.N.Y. Sep. 29, 2008) ("[U]nder the subcontract governing All American's work at the U.S. Open,
both RA and USTA have rights to oversee various aspects of the work performed by All American and
its employees, including approving pricing and menus, and objecting to the continued employment of
any All American employee requiring that employee's termination and removal from the premises.").
259. See, e.g., Virgo v. Riviera Beach Assocs., 30 F.3d 1350, 1361 (11th Cir. 1994) ("[A]ctual
control is a factor to be considered when deciding the 'joint employer' issue, but the authority or power
to control is also highly relevant."); Carter v. Dutchess Cmty. Coll., 735 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1984) ("The
power to control a worker clearly is a crucial factor in determining whether an employment relationship
exists.").
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workforce. The foreclosure means that franchisors, which are often a necessary
party for workers to meaningfully exercise their labor and employment law
rights, and which are also often the best-positioned party to deter legal violations,
are not held responsible. Existing scholarly proposals to expand the joint
employer doctrine in response are correct in their criticism of the current
foreclosure approach. That said, doctrinal expansion is not necessary to find that
franchisors are joint employers, at least in some instances. In this Section, we
will discuss how to operationalize our approach in combatting efforts to narrow
the scope of joint employment. We implore courts and administrative agencies
to meaningfully assess the obvious and less obvious control that is embedded in
the power relations between franchisors and franchisees.
Court and agency adoption of a power as control approach would promote
the fundamental collective bargaining and wage compensation goals 260 of labor
and employment laws because it would hold franchisors responsible under these
laws. It would offset the injustices that can result from employers' vast
bargaining power over individual employees in low-wage workforces. Adoption
of a power as control approach would also advance a purpose underlying all labor
and employment laws: deterring employers from violating employees'
workplace protections. Contrary to the Trump-era NLRB General Counsel's
position that investigating the joint employer status of McDonald's was "not
needed to remedy any allegedly meritorious violation," 261the foreclosure ofjoint
employer liability works against deterrence goals because it removes any
incentive for franchisors to identify, prevent, or correct labor and employment
law violations. The Ninth Circuit's dismissal of the joint employer wage claim
against McDonald's in Salazar represents an extreme form of this worst-of-allworlds scenario: franchisors that instruct franchisees to comply with practices
and policies that violate labor and employment law but face no potential liability
for those violations.262
The current state of affairs may actually encourage franchisors to engage in
forms of indirect control that can harm workers. The uncertainty of the joint

260. Narrowing the joint employer test beyond even what the common law would permit is
contrary to the legislative mandate in wage and hour law to broadly construe the employment
relationship using the "suffer or permit" standard. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). The Supreme Court has reasoned
that the "striking breadth" of this definition covers "some parties who might not qualify as [employees]
under a strict application of traditional agency law principles." Nationwide Mut. Ins. v. Darden, 503
U.S. 318, 326 (1992); see also Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 633, 639 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[C]ourts have
adopted an expansive interpretation of the definitions of 'employer' and 'employee' under the FLSA, in
order to effectuate the broad remedial purposes of the Act.") (internal quotation omitted); Karrv. Strong
Detective Agency, Inc., 787 F.2d 1205, 1207 (7th Cir. 1986) (same). In proposing to rescind its current,
narrow interpretation of the joint employer standard, the DOL correctly acknowledges that the current
rule does not reflect the statute's broad definition of the employment relationship. See 86 Fed. Reg.
14038 (March 12, 2021).
261. Kullgren, supra note 96.
262. See generally Salazar v. McDonald's Corp., 944 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding
McDonald's was not liable as a joint employer even when it required its franchisee to use a payroll
system that caused franchisee to violate California law).
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employer doctrine encourages risk-averse companies to operate well within the
compliance space to avoid even unlikely determinations of liability. This
uncertainty deters franchisors from exerting indirect control that may encourage
violations in franchise stores. As Susan Morse explained, when the law sets a
safe harbor that removes that uncertainty, it encourages regulated entities to shift
their behavior "from the compliance space within the safe harbor[]" to the line
drawn by the safe harbor.2 63 As McDonald's has done, franchisors may seek to
reconfigure their own operations to reduce the possibility of labor and
employment law liability. Our proposed approach seeks to close this loophole
and create incentives to comply with baseline labor and employment standards
by holding franchisors jointly accountable along with their franchisees.
A.

End the JudicialForeclosureof Joint Employer Liability in
FranchisingCases

Judicial application of our franchisor power as employment control
framework would profoundly change the outcomes of joint employer cases
involving franchising, most of which courts currently dismiss right out of the
gate. 264 Courts need not change the joint employer test itself or adopt a different
test in order to address the shortcomings of the dominant approach. Taking
power, and therefore indirect control, more seriously simply requires a
recalibration of evidence of indirect forms of control. As the Third Circuit has
explained, the existence of a franchise relationship "does not necessarily trigger
a master-servant relationship, nor does it automatically insulate the parties from
such a relationship." 265 Discerning the existence of an employment relationship
"depends in each case upon the nature and extent of such control as defined in
the franchise agreement or by the actual practice of the parties." 266
Contrary to the dominant trend, some lower courts have assessed
franchisors in ways that are consistent with our power as control approach. These
courts, when denying motions to dismiss joint employer claims, have provided
guidance to future courts about how to assess evidence of indirect control. For
example, Ocampo v. 455 Hospitality LLC heavily weighed the franchisor's

indirect control in denying a motion to dismiss a FLSA wage claim against a
franchisor. 267 The court found that the plaintiff plausibly alleged that the
franchisor (1) mandated franchise hotel employee trainings; (2) imposed
recordkeeping, business software, and operational controls on the franchisee; (3)
reserved the right to inspect the hotel, including routinely making announced and
unscheduled audits and inspections; (4) reserved the right to make changes to
hotel operations and to terminate franchises that did not comply with standards;
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
15, 2016).

Susan C. Morse, Safe Harbors,Sure Shipwrecks, 49 U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 1385, 1397 (2016).
See supra Part IA.
Drexel v. Union Prescription Ctrs., Inc., 582 F.2d 781, 786 (3d Cir. 1978).
Id.
See Ocampo v. 455 Hosp. LLC, No. 14-CV-9614, 2016 WL 4926204, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
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and (5) was aware of wage and hour law violations and failed to stop them. 268
These allegations were sufficient to state a claim that the franchisor was a joint
employer.269 Parrottv. MarriottInternationalalso looked at forms of indirect

control collectively and similarly denied a motion to dismiss a joint employer
FLSA claim against a hotel franchisor. 270 The court found relevant that the
franchisor had the power to terminate the contract and had policies and meetings
to recommend how the franchisee could reduce labor costs. 271
A few courts have properly considered indirect and reserved forms of
control in the Title VII context as well, using a similar test used by courts
considering claims of joint employment under the NLRA and FLSA. In Elsayed
v. Family FareLLC, the court considered "determining what was sold, the price

of the sale, and how to advertise," as well as mandated hours and uniforms, as
relevant forms of indirect control. 272 It found that the franchisor's refusals to
permit the franchisee to sell particular items and provide customers with
complimentary items were examples of "close supervision" that supported a joint
employer determination. 273 The court also considered the franchisor's
communications about enforcement and monitoring, including assertions to the
franchisee that it was the "boss" who could "fire" the franchisee, as sufficient to
allege a joint employer relationship, despite the lack of other indicia of direct
control. 274 The court in Harris v. Midas similarly considered indirect control

when it denied a motion to dismiss a Title VII claim against a franchisor. 275 The
court found that the franchisor's reserved power to inspect books and records,
issue workplace policies, and require training in those policies, including sexual
harassment policies that the franchisee alleged were violated, showed sufficient
control over workplace rules, supervision, and employee records. 276
As the trial court in Elsayed recognized, these cases diverge from the "line
of cases that emphasizes that franchisors can exercise substantial control over
franchisees without becoming employers of the franchisee's employees."277
They stand in contrast to the dominant trend to foreclose joint employer claims
in franchising and illustrate how courts that foreclosed joint employer claims
should have handled those cases. As the Ninth Circuit instructed in Global
Horizons, considering direct control to the exclusion of other factors stands
268. Id at *6.
269. Id. at *7.
270. No. 17-10359, 2017 WL 3891805, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 2017).
271. Id. at *2.
272. No. 18-cv-1045, 2020 WL 780701, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 18, 2020).
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. No. 17-95, 2017 WL 5177668, at *1-2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2017).
276. Id. The court adopted a Third Circuit version of the Bonnette factors: "(1) the alleged
employer's authority to hire and fire employees, promulgate work rules and assignments, and set
conditions of employment, including compensation, benefits, and hours; (2) the alleged employer's dayto-day supervision of employees, including employee discipline; and (3) the alleged employer's control
of employee records, including payroll, insurance, taxes and the like." Id at * 1.
277. Elsayed, 2020 WL 780701, at *4.
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contrary to the common law agency test, which considers the total indicia of
control. 278 Instead of requiring evidence of control over the instrumentality,
courts should consider whether a franchisor's overall influence and power to codetermine the work is sufficient to state a plausible joint employer relationship
and to avoid summary judgment. 279
This more comprehensive approach to assessing franchisors' indirect
control could end the virtual foreclosure of joint employer liability in
franchising. Required training, payroll systems, employment policies, hiring

policies for managers, and recommended measures to control labor costs can be
strong indirect evidence of a joint employer relationship. It becomes even
stronger when courts also factor in franchisors' intensive monitoring,
inspections, and recommendations tied to franchise retention and renewal. These
findings invite further research into whether and under which circumstances
courts should presume a joint employment relationship based on the types of
indirect control identified in Part 11.280 At a minimum, the types of indirect
control discussed here can be sufficient for a reasonable fact finder to infer that
the franchisor is a joint employer. When franchisors exert significant control
indirectly, such as through the franchise agreement, extensive recommendations
and monitoring, and enforcement measures, courts should find these allegations
sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.281 If such allegations are supported
278. U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'nv. Glob. Horizons, Inc., 915 F.3d 631,638 (9th Cir.
2019) ("[T]here is 'no shorthand formula' for determining whether an employment relationship exists,
so 'all of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one factor being
decisive."' (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324 (1992))).
279. See, e.g., Ramirez-Castellanos v. Nugget Mkt., Inc., No. 17-cv-01025, 2020 WL 2770060,
at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 28, 2020) (adopting the Global Horizons agency test, finding that evidence of
supervision and power to terminate work is sufficient to avoid summary judgment).
280. In 2018 the California Supreme Court in Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court,
416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018), adopted a broader, simpler "ABC" test (named for its three elements), which
presumes employment status for California wage and hour claims. Id. at 36-40. California codified
Dynamex in A.B. 5, but Proposition 22, a voter referendum, exempted some platform network
companies from its reach in 2020. See Kate Conger, Uber and Lyft Drivers in California Will Remain
Contractors,N.Y. TEvms (Nov. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/04/technology/californiauber-lyft-prop-22.html [https://perma.cc/BVZ6-W3KB]. The ABC test presumes employment status in
a number of states. See Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Tax Law's Workplace Shift, 100 B.U. L. REV.
651, 682 (2020). The test, however, primarily addresses employer classification of employees as
independent contractors, and courts have not resolved whether the ABC test also applies to joint
employers. Compare Henderson v. Equilon Enters., LLC, (Cal. Ct. App. 2019), 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d 738,
752-54 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019), appealdenied (Feb. 11, 2020) (holding that the ABC test does not apply
to joint employment because "Dynamex was concerned with the problem of businesses misclassifying
workers as independent contractors so that the business may obtain economic advantages that result
from the avoidance of legal and economic obligations imposed on an employer by the wage order and
other state and federal requirements"), with Moreno v. JCT Logistics, Inc., No. EDCV 17-2489, 2019
WL 3858999, at *7 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2019) (applying Dynamex to both putative direct and joint
employers). Elmore is currently investigating the application of indirect control to the ABC test.
281. See, e.g., Lora v. Ledo Pizza Sys., Inc., No. DKC 16-4002, 2017 WL 3189406, at *6 (D.
Md. July 27, 2017) (denying franchisor's motion to dismiss plaintiffs FLSA claim because plaintiff's
allegations that franchisor "had at least some power to control and supervise workers and to hire, fire,
or modify conditions of employment" at the franchise store were sufficient to allege joint employer
status).
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through credible evidence, courts should consider them sufficient to deny
motions for summary judgment and to dismiss the complaint. 282 Likewise, courts
should consider them sufficient to present a jury question notwithstanding
conflicting evidence by the franchisor. 28 3
B.

DirectAgencies to Investigate Joint Employer Liability in Franchising
Cases

Considerations of power and the ability of franchisors to control franchise
stores indirectly have meaningful implications for public agency enforcement. If
agencies embrace the power as control approach, they could shift their strategic
priorities to investigate joint employer liability in their franchising cases. Most
of the literature about enforcement of employment laws emphasizes private
enforcement through the judiciary because of the limitations of public
enforcement and the need to fill public enforcement gaps. 28 4
But executive branch agencies, both in federal and state government, also
have a key role to play in labor and employment enforcement. As Michael
Waterstone argued, public enforcers are not constrained by the need to finance
litigation or by various doctrinal limitations that often hamper class claims. 285
This is why the Trump-era NLRB's General Counsel was wrong in refusing to

investigate allegations of joint employment when the direct employer (the
franchisee) acknowledged itself as the employer. It is no coincidence that both
the McDonald's and Domino's cases began as public agency investigations. The
evidence of their exercised power came from testimony by franchisor
representatives and franchisees, evidence that is not easily available prior to
litigation or a formal agency investigation.
The power dynamics between franchisors and franchisees, and the controls
they foster, are not easily recognizable to the naked eye of the would-be-plaintiff
employees who experience a labor or employment law violation in the course of
their work. Frontline employees are unlikely to have access to the complexities

282. See, e.g., Elsayedv. Fam. Fare LLC, 18-cv-1045, 2020 WL 780701, at *2, *5-6 (M.D.N.C.
Feb. 18, 2020) (converting franchisor's motion to dismiss to motion for summary judgment based on
franchisor affidavits contradicting plaintiff's evidence supporting joint employment determination, and
finding genuine issue of material facts sufficient to deny motion).
283. See, e.g., Sarikaputarv. Veratip Corp., No. 17-CV-814, 2020 WL 4572677, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 7, 2020) (finding that factual disputes about defendant's alleged employer status were material to
the case and had to be decided at trial); Ramirez-Castellanos,2020 WL 2770060, at *5 (holding that,
because the defendant implicitly admitted there were genuine issues of material fact, a jury would decide
the disputed issue of whether defendant jointly employed the plaintiffs).
284. See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of SelfRegulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 376 (2005) ("Private lawsuits can potentially help to fill the
enforcement gap left by the undercommitment of public resources; indeed, they can sometimes supply
a big gun where public enforcement has none to wield."); Andrew Elmore, The State Qui Tam to Enforce
Employment Law, 69 DEPAUL L. REV. 357, 362 (2020) (noting that public agencies provide "a small
fraction of total enforcement" of employment law enforcement).
285. Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of PublicEnforcement, 92 MINN. L. REV. 434, 461-65
(2007) (discussing the disability rights context).
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of this one-sided business relationship and how it might lead to a change in their
work hours or the speed at which they complete a task. These information
asymmetries create significant uncertainty about the success of any joint

employer claim. Given this uncertainty, it is unlikely that the documentation in
the McDonald's and Domino's cases would have ever been unearthed in a legal
analysis that required direct control and thus essentially presumed no joint
employer relationship at the outset.
Agency adoption of our power as control approach is even more crucial in
the wake of Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 28 6 which has limited workers' access
to justice. Epic requires that courts now enforce employer mandatory arbitration

agreements with class-action waivers under the Federal Arbitration Act.287 After
Epic, claims by low-wage workers in franchise stores are likely only available
for systemic violations that can be arbitrated en masse or that become subjects
of public pressure and legal mobilization, such as the Fight for Fifteen
movement. 288
In contrast, public agencies can investigate and

litigate these claims

generally without being subject to mandatory arbitration agreements. Most
individual wage and hour law claims are low value.289 Therefore, it is unlikely
that the potential recovery from an individual claim would justify the time and
expense of seeking to prove ajoint employer relationship. 290 But in areas of labor
and employment law like joint employer claims in franchised sectors, which is
widely considered underenforced, 291 redundant enforcement by private litigators
and public agencies can be productive. 292 Public agency enforcement can both
provide access to justice for individuals who cannot engage in private litigation
and develop individual complaints into systemic litigation unlikely to occur
through private enforcement alone. Without the aggregation of private claims
that could justify the discovery necessary to establish a joint employer
relationship, it will continue to be crucial for public agencies to pursue joint
employer theories when investigating complaints in franchise stores.
286.
287.
288.

138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
Id at 1632.
See Elmore, supra note 284, at 379-86; Griffith & Gates, supranote 4, at 249.
289.
See J. Maria Glover, The StructuralRole of PrivateEnforcement Mechanisms in Public
Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1184 (2012).
290. See Charlotte S. Alexander & Arthi Prasad, Bottom-Up Workplace Law Enforcement: An
EmpiricalAnalysis, 89 IND. L.J. 1069, 1117-18 (2014) (arguing in favor of public enforcement where
private enforcement leaves gaps, including "cases in which workers would be particularly unlikely to
complain on their own, where workers have low levels of substantive and procedural legal knowledge,
and where workers are highly susceptible to retaliation").
291. WEiL, supra note 18, at 131-132 (finding that "[t]he probability of noncompliance [with
wage and hour law] is about 24% higher among franchisee-owned outlets than among otherwise similar
company-owned outlets").
292. As Zachary Clopton argued, public and private enforcement offer independent potential
benefits, and redundant enforcement is particularly beneficial if the enforcers are sufficiently
differentiated to address the resource constraints, information deficits, and other causes of
underenforcement. Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant Public-Private Enforcement, 69 VAND. L. REV.

285, 308-13 (2016).
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Like the NLRB's McDonald's investigation and the NYAG's Domino's

investigation, agencies should approach complaints of labor and employment
law violations by considering whether there is a plausible joint employer. At the
outset, agencies may assess whether the terms in the franchise agreement show
the types of reserved control that suggest a plausible joint employer relationship.
If so, agencies should require franchisees to disclose the on-the-ground practices
of the franchisor, including manuals, IT systems, trainings, inspections, and
ongoing monitoring related to franchise retention and renewal. If these control
measures suggest substantial indirect control, agencies should seek a
determination of joint employer status.
Further, to spur private litigation that will benefit from public
investigations, public agencies should make investigation findings and
underlying investigative material public after the investigation's completion
whenever possible. Besides being necessary to assess the indirect control of a
franchisor, consideration of a franchisor's power over its franchisees will also
inform the agency's evaluation of whether investigating the franchisor will
advance the deterrence, remedial, and collective bargaining goals of workplace
laws.
CONCLUSION

This Article argues that holding franchisors responsible for labor and
employment law obligations will require deeper interrogation of how franchisor
power transmutes into franchisor influence over workers' wages and working
conditions. This approach will require taking a fuller account of various types of
unexercised and exercised control, which appear in the franchise agreement and
in franchisors' on-the-ground practices. To advance this argument, we rely on
insights from original empirical analyses of (1) forty-four contracts between
leading fast-food franchisors and their franchisees in 2016 and (2) extensive
documentation provided in joint employer legal proceedings against two major
fast-food franchisors in the United States-McDonald's and Domino's.
Our proposed power as control construct, which would fit into existing
doctrine, considers the cumulative effect of franchisors' reserved and exercised
influence over the working conditions in their franchisees. Taking franchisors'
power more seriously in legal analyses of control would help courts,
administrative agencies, and policy-makers advance the goals of labor and
employment law within the confines of existing doctrines, thereby reducing
unnecessary harm to some of the lowest-paid workers in the U.S. economy.

